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Chapter 1
SUMMARY
Introduction
A study has been conducted by Gellman Research Associates,
Inc. .(GRA) at the request of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, to
examine the question of technology transfer through interna-
tional arrangements for production of commercial transport
aircraft. The objectives were: to determine the likelihood of
such transfer under various representative conditions; to develop
an understanding of the economic motivations for, and effects of,
joint venture arrangements; and to assess the relevant public
policy implications. As the study progressed, several of the non-
technological aspects appeared to warrant increased emphasis, both
because of their bearing on the technology transfer question and
because they raise valid public policy issues in their own right.
The study results and the contractor's observations on the find-
ings are presented in this report.
There have been significant changes in the commercial air-
craft manufacturing industry in the last several decades, producing
t
an environment in which the level of industry costs has spiralled.
In meaningful degree, this grows out of the situation where initial
investment (or threshold) project costs are rising and threaten to
become prohibitively high. In addition, the express intention of
other nations to expand their respective shares of the free-world
market for commercial transport aircraft—a market in which the
U.S. has been overwhelmingly predominant—has introduced great
uncertainty into all manufacturers' assessments of precisely what
and where the market for any proposed U.S. commercial aircraft
will be. Consequently, U.S. airframe producers may be unable to
develop new generations of commercial air transport unless the
structure of the industry is modified so as to accommodate these
pressures while maintaining their individual competitive viability.
Any modification of an industry's structure which addresses prob-
lems of these sorts is a "rationalization."
The Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R&D of the
Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House of
Representatives called for U.S. public policy to be such as to
ensure the maintenance of "our worldwide commercial leadership
in air transportation." Rationalization of the U.S. commercial
airframe industry, in order "to protect that commercial leader-
ship, can be achieved through several means, among which are
2
consortia and alternative "cooperative arrangements." A number
of alternative cooperative arrangements are listed in Exhibit 1-1.
This report examines these cooperative arrangements and the
U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Aviation and Transpor-
tation R&D, The Future of Aviation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976.
2A thorough definition and description of consortia is con-
tained in the Appendix.
Exhibit 1-1
TYPICAL "COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS" FOR THE
PRODUCTION OF CIVIL TRANSPORT AIRFRAMES
Multi-National Consortium without U.S.
Participation
Multi-National Consortium with U.S.
Participation
Multi-National Prime-Subcontractor
Arrangement with Formal Risk Sharing
Multi-National Prime-Subcontractor
Arrangement without Formal Risk Sharing
Multi-National Co-Production
All-U.S. Airframe Consortium
All-U.S. Prime-Subcontractor Arrangement
with Formal Risk Sharing
All-U.S. Prime-Subcontractor Arrangement
without Formal Risk Sharing
Example(s)
Concorde*; A-300B
None at present.**
F-28
DC-.9; DC-10
F-27; BAG 1-11; VFW 614
None
L-1011; B-747
B-707; B-727
Included co-production of aircraft.
**
The CFM-56 aircraft engine is being developed by a consortium
comprised of General Electric (U.S.) and SNECMA (France).
implications of such mechanisms for U.S. interests. The report
focuses primarily, though not exclusively, on multi-national
consortia with U.S. participation because they generate the full
range of public policy issues attending rationalization (includ-
ing especially technology transfer), and also because they may
emerge as the most acceptable alternative cooperative arrangement
given the basic conditions of supply and demand facing this
industry.
Methodology
The work program underlying this study involved, first, an
extensive search and analysis of existing literature to identify
the key issues to be addressed in determining the public policy
implications of the formation of consortia for production of
3
transport aircraft.
Then, in-person interviews were conducted with executives
of a large proportion of U.S. and European commercial airframe
producers. Those interviewed ranged from senior corporate offi-
cers to high-level division engineering, planning, and financial
executives. Each meeting was conducted with the understanding
that the names of the cooperating- firms, but not of the specific
4persons interviewed, would be disclosed. The firms interviewed
were:
3
A bibliography is appended to this report.
4
For this reason, most undocumented statements made in this
report are actually buttressed by information or opinions supplied
by the persons interviewed.
0
 The Boeing Company,
0
 McDonnell Douglas Corporation,
0
 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,
0
 Fokker-VFW International B.V.,
0
 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (Aerospatiale),
0
 British Aerospace Corporation,
0
 Airbus Industrie.
In addition, there were interviews with U.S. Government offi-
cials in several agencies.
The final step in the research program was to codify and
analyze the information gathered and to determine the public policy
implications of consortia of various sorts.
Conclusions
The formation and operation of consortia permit individual
commercial airframe manufacturers to reduce the financial resources
required below what would be needed if the firm were to undertake
a particular project alone. (This is not to say that the total
initial investment required or subsequent unit production costs
are lowest in a consortium setting, however.)
Multi-national consortia which include U.S. firms could help
preserve U.S. access to free-world commercial airframe markets
but would also increase non-U.S. -firms' participation in the U.S.
market.
The operation of consortia incorporating both foreign and
U.S. manufacturers raises myriad issues, some with public policy
5
implications. One such set of implications concerns the possi-
bility that technology may be transferred in the course of a
consortium's development and operation. There are three types
of technology that would be subject to transfer:
1) airframe product-embodied technology,
2) manufacturer process technology, and
3) management technology or technique.
Product-embodied technology is fast-moving and tends to lose
significance as a competitive factor shortly after it is ready
for incorporation in an aircraft development venture. The inter-
views conducted in this study indicated that product-embodied
technology at the present time is considered to be at an essen-
tially equivalent level of sophistication in the developed
nations of the free world. For these reasons, the possible trans-
fer of such technology via the consortium route is not a serious
public policy concern. If research advances were to result in
significant disparities in this area in the future, both private
and public policies and programs would require reassessment.
Process and management technologies are more likely to differ
among companies, and are more durable; their transfer would be
more significant in terms of subs_equent competition. U.S. process
technology has been acknowledged to be superior by foreign compe-
titors; furthermore, it is demonstrably transferable. U.S. commer-
cial airframe manufacturers attribute their free-world market
predominance largely to management technique; however, manufacturers
in other nations have apparently not yet recognized the value of
U.S. management technique and certainly do not see it as a major
source of the continuing U.S. competitive edge in commercial
transport airframes.
Transfer of process and management technology can be promoted
or minimized in a multi-national consortium. The extent of tech-
nology transfer is a function of the division of responsibilities
among participants, the duration of the consortium project(s),
and the organization and structure of the consortium.
Although it appears that the U.S. Government can have only
limited control over transfer of process and management technology
once a consortium is established, it is probable that any unique
technology that Government would seek to protect on national
security or other grounds (such as balance of payments) would be
the same technology which U.S. entrepreneurs would also wish to
protect for its competitive value.
Another set of public policy implications related to multi-
national consortia with U.S. participation concerns the view of
authorities of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice with regard to cooperative ventures as a means of achiev-
ing rationalization of the commercial aircraft manufacturing
industry. The Justice Department is not presently receptive to
the idea that rationalization of the industry may be a necessary
precondition to its long-term competitive viability. Unless
antitrust policy and instrumentalities are modified to provide the
industry with guidelines sufficiently substantial to be relied
upon or challenged, as appropriate, they will remain significant
barriers to the formation of both domestic and multi-national
consortia.
Additional public policy implications generated by consortia
affect such areas as employment, competition in transport air-
craft markets, balance of payments, technological preeminence,
and market predominance. The extent to which the U.S. intends to
maintain its dominant position in the commercial airframe field
is central to determining the detrimental results of transferring
U.S. production process technology and management technique to
foreign airframe (or components) manufacturers. The establishment
of clear U.S. Government goals with regard to the level of pre-
dominance to be realized by the U.S. in the free-world commercial
airframe market, however, requires extensive understanding of
both the economic and competitive characteristics of the commer-
cial airframe market. Assuming that government policy does
include the maintenance of a dominant U.S. position, direct
government intervention may be required to rationalize the commer-
cial aircraft manufacturing industry if consortia and/or other
cooperative arrangements are not-implemented by the industry
t
itself. Cooperative arrangements, however, appear to be a more
efficient means of rationalization than direct government interven-
tion. All-U.S. consortia in particular may be capable of generating
net effects which are substantially positive in terms of the overall
interests of the United States.
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Chapter 2
MOTIVES FOR AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERS
TO PARTICIPATE IN CONSORTIA
While there is a wide range of "cooperative arrangements"
possible for the production of civil transport airframes,
the discussion that follows largely centers around consortia.
Primarily, this is because the full panoply of issues a firm faces
when considering a "cooperative arrangement" is found in the
context of the consortium.
There are two major groups of incentives for domestic airframe
manufacturers to participate in consortia. The first set of motives
is rooted in the problems associated with amassing the tremendous
financial, physical, and intellectual resources necessary to under-
take such a large and risky business venture as the design, development,
production, and marketing of a commercial transport aircraft. The
second group of incentives is more subjective; it consists of con-
cerns about the viability of-U.S.-built transports in important foreign
markets (as well as the viability of foreign-built transports in U.S.
markets). By reviewing the relevant motives for airframe manufacturers
to participate in consortia, the implications of these intercorporate
arrangements can be more fully appreciated.
•v
Economic Incentives
The production of modern commercial aircraft requires great
aggregations of capital goods, skilled labor, aerospace engineers
and designers, and an expensive inventory of production tools.
See Exhibit 1-1, page 3.
The industry's production function is consequently highly intensive
in both intellectual and physical capital. Even so, compared to
many other industries, the manufacturing of commercial airframes
seems unexceptional but for the substantial risks which attend in-
vestments in civil transport aircraft development and construction.
There is also a number of distinct but interrelated factors associated
with production and risk in this industry. Such factors often act
as economic incentives for domestic airframe manufacturers to con-
sider participating in consortia. This is because such arrangements
tend to spread costs and risks while minimizing the maximum loss which
can be experienced by any one participant.
High Initial Investment
To produce a commercial airframe, the manufacturer must assemble
a critical mass of resources consisting of fixed assets and techno-
logical research and development. The technological investment in-
cludes time and materials devoted to research, design, development,
and perhaps prototype development, all of which are steps in the
lengthy process of innovation. Depending partly upon how radical the
technological advances are, these investments can range from several
2
million to more than one billion dollars for subsonic transports.
2
Shields Model Roland, Inc., The Boeing Company: A Strategy
for Continued Market Dominance (New York:SMR, 1976), pp. 27-29;
Hartman L. Butler, Jr., George J. Podrasky, and J. Devon Allen, "The
Aerospace Industry Re-Revisited: Commercial Aircraft," Financial
Analysts Journal 33 (September/October 1977): 56.
10
3
In addition to this front-end investment, the manufacturer must
assemble capital comprised of tools, a production-line building, a
production line, a comprehensive marketing effort, and working
capital. These resources are amassed prior to production of the air-
craft. Consequently, long before the first aircraft is delivered,
hundreds of millions of dollars will have been committed by an air-
frame manufacturer involved in a major new development program.
The magnitude of these resources and the problems inherent in
predicting their size are shown in Exhibits 2-1 and 2-2 taken from
material provided by McDonnell Douglas. The precipitous climb in
development costs beginning with the DC-3 in the mid-1920s and con-
tinuing through to the delivery of the DC-10 is shown in Exhibit 2-1.
Costs are increasing faster than empty weight of aircraft; the price
per pound of empty weight climbed from $82 in the case of the DC-3
to $6,300 for the DC-10 (measured in 1975 constant dollars). As
Exhibit 2-2 shows, the launching cost of the DC-10 was the equivalent
of 155 percent of the equity value of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co.,
in contrast with the relatively smaller commitment required to launch
For accounting purposes, Boeing did not capitalize these expendi-
tures, while McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed did capitalize most of them
and amortize them over a "block" of production output, say, 300 aircraft.
However, Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 2, issued
in October 1974,provides that all research and development costs must be
expensed when incurred. Other costs can be spread over a block; Boeing,
McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed each allocate on a unit cost basis the
block's estimated cumulative production costs and tooling costs when
computing an aircraft's cost of sales.. Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and
Boeing each employ this technique. See Butler, Podrasky, Allen, p. 60;
also refer to Note 2 in Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 1976 Annual Report
(Burbank: Lockheed, 1977), p. 17.
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the DC-6 (42 percent of Douglas equity). The cost of development
(including inflation) is, according to Douglas, likely to grow at
approximately 11 percent annually, a rate that could exceed the
4
growth in the firm's equity base. This implies that in the future
the fixed cost of airframe development will become an increasingly
heavy burden for individual aircraft manufacturers to bear.
The critical mass of the above-enumerated resources is the
threshold investment required of an airframe producer that wishes to
continue its participation in the industry, since it is not possible
to reduce proportionately the quantity of resources needed to produce
fewer aircraft. The lumpiness of investment is characteristic of
the production of aircraft. A company that manufacturers aircraft
can mitigate the lumpiness problem by assuming responsibilities for
only a subset of all the tasks in the process of manufacture. Other
producers can bear responsibilities for the other tasks of manufacture.
This ability to parcel out tasks—in order to avoid the lumpiness
problem--is a strong incentive over time for a number of corporate en-
tities to participate jointly in the development and production process-
perhaps through a consortium.
At the present time, despite recent improvements in its financial
condition, Lockheed in particular'would seem to be heavily constrained
in its ability to finance the initial investment, required for major air-
frame development. As of the end of fiscal 1976, its net worth was only
4See Exhibit 2-2.
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$167 million. Furthermore, the profitability of its commercial
aircraft division is questionable. Despite its technical capabili-
ties, Lockheed is effectively foreclosed from development of a new
aircraft (significantly different from its existing L-1011). This
company, especially, feels the pressures to seek out coventurers--
whether other airframe companies, unrelated companies, customers, banks,
or governments—to aid it in keeping its product line competitive.
Though not as weak as Lockheed, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
feel similar pressures to help lower the price of entry into a new
airframe program. Their net worths at the end of 1976 were $1,092
million and $945 million respectively. Considering the billion or
o
more dollars required to launch a major project such as the B-7X7,
even Boeing would have to be willing to bet the equivalent of the
value of the whole company. Although the overall McDonnell Douglas
net worth is great, it is rot in the best position to launch a major
Q
new program because the Douglas division's own profitability is not
Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress
by the Comptroller General of the United States: Implementation of
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act (Washington:General Accounting Office,
April 25, 1977), p. 12.
Boeing Company, Annual Report 1976 (Seattle: Boeing, March 7,
1977). . .
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1976 Annual Report (St. Louis: McDonnel
Douglas, December 31, 1976).
Q
Shields Model Roland, The Boeing Company, pp. 27-29.
9National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Ames Research Center,
The Economics of Air Transport Manufacturing, Volume I: Industry Analysis,
by Donald W. Kyle and others of SYSTAN, Inc.(Los Altos:SYSTAN, 1974),
p. 19; Butler, Podrasky, and Allen, "The Aerospace Industry Re-Revisited,"
pp. 62, 55.
1!
particularly strong nor is the overall company's balance sheet as
solid as Boeing's.
Financing and Risk—Risk is one of the key variables in the
financing equation. One type of risk is exhibited by the example
of a proposed short-range, twin derivative of the DC-Id, a project
with initial launch cost probably equal to about half that of the
B-7X7. In this case, McDonnell Douglas is understandably concerned
about whether such a derivative can attract sufficient demand to
permit capital recovery in light of the fact that an existing air-
craft, the A-300B, already addresses much the same market. A major
risk is that a proposed aircraft may not succeed because another air-
craft already serves a market which Douglas can enter only several
years hence. (Boeing encountered this same problem in the mid-1960s
when it chose to launch the B-737 program even though Douglas' DC-9
had a headstart.)
While the DC-10 derivative program exhibits one type of risk,
there are many others. For example, a significant capital shortage
may face the airline industry; financing may be difficult to obtain
for many airlines in need of new aircraft because they are heavily
leveraged and they have vol a.tile.profit records. Without subscribing
\
fully to the implications of the table, it is interesting to note
that in Exhibit 2-3, of the "big four" trunk carriers only United is
shown to have investment capacity sufficient to meet its needs. The
chart indicates that American, TWA, and Eastern will have a shortfall in
16
Exhib i t 2-3
SUMMARY OF INVESTMENT CAPACITY VERSUS NEEDS
! 1976-1990
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Company
Northwest
Delta
Braniff
United
National
Western
Continental
American
Pan American
TWA
Eastern
TOTAL
($ Bi
Investment
Capacity*
$10.5
14.3
4.8 "*
18.4
3.9
3.6
3.1
7.9
4.9
6.0
4.6
11 ion)
Investment Surplus or
Needs (Shortfall)
$4.8
7.4
*••'•• 3.0
11.9
2.6
3.2
2.9
9.4
6.9
9.2
8.1
$5.7
6.9
1.8
6.5
1.3
0.4
0.2
(1.5)
(2.0)
(3.2)
(3.5)
Surplus or (Shortfall )
as a % of
Investment
Capacity
54.3%
48.3
37.5
35.3
33.3
11.1
6.5
(19.0)
(40.8)
(53.3)
(76.1)
$82.0 $69.4 $12.6 15.4%
Estimates for investment capacity to finance flight and ground
equipment requirements for U.S. trunk carriers through 1990 are based
on maintencance by carriers of their existing market shares in a sim-
ulation that was developed by Shield Model Roland, a New York invest-
ment firm. While the group as a whole can meet projected requirements,
some carriers will have excess investment capacity and some too little,
the study estimates.
Source: William
Aviation
H. Gregory, "Airline Reequipment Financing Studied* "
Week & Space Technology, 107 (July 11, 1977): 26-29.
investment capacity totaling $8.2 billion. The magnitude of this
capital insufficiency is dramatically apparent since the total assets
of the three companies in 1976, collectively, were only $4.82 billion.
Beyond this purely financial problem and the risk to manufacturers
that it implies, the U.S. airline industry is currently facing the
prospect of economic regulatory reform which has introduced much
uncertainty concerning future competition between air carriers.
From the standpoint of any individual airline, regulatory reform in-
troduces uncertainty because the company does not know by whom or how
its markets may be intruded upon. In other words, demand for air
service may remain strong, but each carrier's share is by no means
dependable. Therefore, from the perspective of an airframe manu-
facturer, the picture is clouded as to who the customers will be and
what aircraft they will require.
For different reasons, uncertainty concerning future airline demand
for aircraft also exists on a worldwide basis. Nationalism and pro-
tectionism have emerged as important factors in the flight equipment
investment decisions of European flag carriers. Depending upon the
resolution of such issues, some of these major historical customers
could become uncertain sales prospects for U.S. aircraft companies in
general. Risks of the sort outlined above tend to make "cooperative
E.F. Mutton & Co., "Airline Financial and Operating Statistics,"
June 1977, •
.The word "uncertainty" refers to possibilities which are not
susceptible to the probabilistic approaches used in risk analysis.
8
ventures" more appealing than would otherwise be the case and multi-
national arrangements may be the most attractive response of all
for commercial airframe producers.
Principal Economic Incentives to Form Consortia
With front-end costs so high and risks and uncertainty so great,
it can increasingly be expected that only one entity can profitably
produce a given "class" of aircraft. In this connection, Exhibit 2-4,
developed by McDonnell Douglas, is especially instructive. The data
underscored the per-aircraft cost penalties incurred by producing
350, 233, or 175 instead of 700 aircraft. The chart suggests that two
competitors would have to sell a total of at least 1,400 similar air-
craft with comparable production cost characteristics in order to
reduce average unit cost to a level experienced by a single manufacturer
selling 700 aircraft. In any case, if the market for such aircraft is
below 700, the average unit cost will be higher than a minimum. While
it is far from clear that average unit costs and unit prices have been
(or will be) closely and continually correlated with one another,
where there is effective competition in the market, prices should be
lower when costs are lower. This suggests the desirability of formulating
and administering public policy so that suitably low unit costs of pro-
X . -I o
duction are achievable for products such as transport aircraft, '" where
With reference to Exhibit 2-4, no inference should be drawn that
700 aircraft or any other level of production represents the most
efficient output for transport aircraft manufacture. It is interesting
to note, however, that only two commercial jet aircraft production runs
have yet exceeded 700--the B-727 and B-707--and the DC-9 may well be
the last to do so. The B-727 series appears likely to prove the only
commercial aircraft program in this century to exceed 1,000 units, which
has already been achieved.
19
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their use is vested with public need.
Oligopolistic Industry Structure—The aircraft industry is an
"oligopoly," a condition which exists "...where there are few
sellers who sell differentiated (rather than identical) products."
Another discussion of oligopoly indicates that the aircraft industry
is appropriately characterized as such because only a few producers
vie to sell their products, which are differentiate, but their pro-
ducts are competitive with each other and "...each [seller] believes
his economic fortunes are perceptibly influenced by the market actions
14
of other individual firms." . If the actions of one competitor did
not directly depend upon or influence the reaction of another
competitor, then this industry would be characterized as "monopolistically
competitive."
Competition is a powerful regulating force in the aircraft
industry. Even though most aircraft are quite distinguishable from
all others, they are partial-substitutes for each other; that is, cross-
elasticities of demand have usually been significant. This has remained
the case despite increasing concentration of the industry both in the
U.S. and abroad. Exhibit 2-5 relates the number of domestic U.S. air-
craft manufacturers to new program starts and shows the increase in con-
centration. Fewer programs have be'en launched as the number of manu-
facturers decline, but two of the remaining manufacturers continue to
13Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1970), p. 466.
F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), p. 10.
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-sell at least two commercial airframes. But the key to the existence
15of effective competition is not the number of competitors or even
the rate at which they introduce new products; rather, it is whether
the remaining few competitors have been unable to act as monopolists,
whose behavior is often reflected in pricing policy in such markets.
As noted previously, the decrease in the number of airframe
manufacturers over the past four decades is a natural result of the
acceleration in the capital or threshold investment associated with
producing more modern aircraft. But it is equally important to point
out that effective competition usually results when two or more air-
craft are partial substitutes for one another. For example, the
B-727 is a partial substitute for the DC-9, as the DC-10 is for the
B-747. It also seems that for some airlines, a combination of DC-lOs
and B-727s can be a substitute for a fleet of A-300s, a conclusion
reached in 1977 by Western Air Lines. This form of competition is
usually both desirable and beneficial. Near perfect substitutes,
however, can create difficulties where threshold costs are high. This
can be illustrated through the DC-10 and L-1011 where competition often
described as de.structive leads to a situation where one or both of
the aircraft will fail to earn any profits for their producers.
In sum, as long as the demand for several specific aircraft types
is somewhat cross-elastic, each producer has a powerful incentive to
Effective competition" is used here to mean competition
sufficient to limit monopoly behavior.
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produce its own "entry" in an efficient manner and to offer it at
an attractive price. Failure to do so can only cause other air-
craft to be more successful in capturing airline business. It
follows that this industry is most likely in the long run to operate
competitively and stably when each supplier offers a product which
is clearly differentiable from all others. The Europeans appear
to reflect this concept as their commercial aircraft firms have come
to specialize in medium-range and short-range aircraft (e.g., A-300B,
F-28, and BAG 1-11). There seems to be recognition that destructive
competition is avoided so long as the aircraft offered are not
functionally too close to one another. Producers are not thereby
guaranteed a profit on their respective programs, but they at least
expect to be spared the financially debilitating consequences of
"excessive" competition.
Exhibit 2-6 shows a variety of aircraft aligned by carrying
capacity (expressed in terms.of body size) and by range. This table,
among other things, points out the present crowding of proposals in
"medium body," short-to-medium range aircraft; these aircraft all
accommodate between 180 and 250 passengers. Certainly, if all or
most of the aircraft in each of the relevant "cells" of Exhibit 2-6 are
offered, competition between them will be keen and perhaps destructive.
It is "inter-cell" competition that is more healthy and is more likely
to emerge when each manufacturer produces a differentiable aircraft.
Profits are realizable provided that sufficient demand for
the product exists and that the manufacturer's process is efficient.
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Exhibit 2-6
AIRCRAFT BY RANGE AND SIZE
Short Haul
Medium Haul
Long Haul
Super Long Haul
(part of Long
Haul)
Narrow Body
DC-9**
B-737**
BAG 111**
B-727-200**
B-707**
DC-8***
Concorde**
DC-8-62, 63***
Medium Body
B-7N7*
Mercure 200*
DC-10-Twin*
BAC X-ll*
B-7X7*
DC-X-200*
A-300B-10*
A-200*
B-7X7*
Wide Body
A-300B**
B-747SR**
DC-10-10**
L-1011**
A-300B**
B-747**
DC-1 0-30/40**
L-1011-500*
B-747SP**
Source: Shields Model Roland, Inc., The Boeing Company: A Strategy
for Continued Market Dominance, report done for Boeing
(New York: SMR, 1976), p. 14. (Modified and expanded by
GRA.)
Legend: *proposed
**currently available
***no longer in production
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The commercial airframe business increasingly requires that
each manufacturer produce or participate in the production of an
aircraft which can turn a profit for its manufacturer. At the same
time, this aircraft should have its own niche in the market, but
nonetheless be faced by other aircraft which can do effectively and
efficiently some of the jobs it can. In this way, profits can be
earned from each aircraft program while at the same time society
avoids the problems associated with more or less strict monopoly.
Non-Economic Reasons for Forming Consortia
This chapter has previously identified the most powerful economic
pressures which can lead otherwise competitive airframe producers to
form consortia for the development, manufacture, and sale of new
transport aircraft. But there are other factors as well. Those which
motivate European airframe firms are especially relevant and it is
interesting to contrast their attitudes toward cooperative arrange-
ments with U.S. companies to their view of ventures where only
European enterprises are involved.
European Objectives
The goals of European airframe producers are different from the
•w
«.
long-term objectives of U.S. companies because the formers' collective
share of the world market is relatively small and because their value
systems are often different.
For a detailed discussion, refer to John. E. Steiner, "The
Timing of Technology for Commercial Transport Aircraft," Astronautics &
Aeronautics (October 1977), pp. 44-46.
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British Aerospace Corporation, Aerospatiale, and several other
European firms are nationalized. The nationalized companies often
are not profit-maximizing enterprises in the same sense as their
U.S. counterparts. Nationalized corporations become direct instru-
ments of national policies (such as by maintaining relatively stable
employment, even in the face of gyrations in orders).
In contrast, private-sector enterprises, such as the U.S. air-
18
craft producers (and Fokker-VFW in Europe), are not routinely used
as instruments of national social policy. Consequently, the
decisionmaking response of a private-sector firm and a nationalized
firm, confronted with the same issue, may very well be different.
Again, the nationalized enterprise's usual preoccupation with such goals
as employment maximization influences their motivations for con-
sortium participation, and at the same time, conditions U.S. firms'
attitudes towards such undertakings if it requires their being in
league with public enterprises.
National and regional pride is another significant factor govern-
ing aerospace industry goals in Europe and elsewhere. French pride,
especially, is considered to be a force which motivates European (or
French) equality with other—i.e.^ U.S.—aerospace manufacturers.
t.
As a result, the French view of all-European consortia is understandably
1 o
Dutch and German firms are in the private sector, although
their governments play active roles by supplying some risk capital.
27
/• y
different from their attitude toward amalgamations with non-European
partners, especially if such ventures were to include U.S. firms,
regardless of the basis.
Both European public officials and industry executives con-
tinually stress the importance of maintaining independent national
or regional capability to conduct a comprehensive aircraft research,
development, production, and marketing program. In general, an
obviously subordinate role, such as one where European responsibilities
would consist solely of partial manufacture of an aircraft, is not
accepted happily. In support of their position, Europeans often point
out that it is important to maintain an all-around aircraft capability
for military purposes.
Individual Motives for Airframe Manufacturers to Participate in
Consortia
Exhibit 2-7 is a matrix which displays the most significant
motives for individual manufacturers to participate in consortia.
It is based upon a program of interviews carried out in the U.S. and
Europe supported by a supplementary literature analysis. The interview
results are tabulated to reflect the different motive patterns of the
several firms depending on whether pr not U.S. firms were assumed to
be included as participants.
Considering first the responses to the possibility of consortia
with U.S. participation, it is of significance that the "vision" of a
consortium arrangement held by U.S. firms contrasts quite sharply with
28
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that of potential European partners, even though there are some
differences within each group. For example, two of the three U.S.
commercial airframe producers (Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas) see
the enhancement of their respective financial resources as being the
most attractive motive for them to participate in any multi-national
consortium. In contrast, none of the European firms ranks this
motive very high. For them, where a U.S.-European consortium was the
issue, the clear primary motive was market penetration. They are
aware of the size of the U.S. market (even if it is presently declin-
ing as a proportion of the total world market), and they are also
sensitive to the fact that American manufacturers have achieved great
success selling aircraft both at home and abroad. So it is not en-
tirely surprising to find that market expansion dominates their think-
ing about consor.tia with U.S. manufacturers participating.
But the responses reflected in Exhibit 2-7 do not tell the whole
story either, especially for" the U.S. firms. For example, in the
recent past, especially since June 1977, when the French took a hard
line against an order for Boeing 737 aircraft, the preservation of
market access for U.S. firms has become increasingly important. Both
Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas indicated that this motive was strength-
ening—but their primary motive remained enhancement of their own
financial resources through such arrangements as multi-national consortia.
In contrast, preservation of market access was by far the strongest
motive for Boeing, with financial leverage being decidedly subsidiary
30
as is explained by Boeing's present strong profit performance
and balance sheet condition. In a sense, however, Boeing's view
of consortia as a means of the firm's participating simultaneously
in more than one aircraft development and production project implies
a desire to enhance its financial resources. Boeing indicates it
will not again attempt simultaneous, multiple projects on its own
as a matter of policy because of its unhappy experience in the
1960s with several contemporaneous civil transport development programs.
In any event, Boeing appears dedicated to going forward with one
major program on its own, perhaps employing some appropriate
"cooperative arrangement" to pursue any other attractive new aircraft
opportunity that is perceived to be available. Given Boeing's long-
standing predominant position in the world market for civil transport
aircraft, and given their previous history, this strategy seems
19
entirely rational.
It may appear at first that Boeing's position as reflected in
Exhibit 2-7 is at variance with the immediately preceding discussion.
Such is not the case. The table reflects the manufacturers' views with
respect to a consortium arrangement for a single next project. In
extended conversation with Boeing.executives, it became clear that the
1 q
"The interviews with the U.S. firms underscore the fact that
positions can change over time. Certainly Boeing's view of its
capabilities and objectives has shifted, as has the comparative
importance for Douglas or Lockheed of various motives for considering
the consortium as a means to an end.
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firm did not then see a consortium as either a necessary or
attractive alternative for a first new aircraft project, but that
if a consortium were employed for such a project, it would certainly
be for market access reasons. For a second contemporaneous project,
however, a consortium arrangement becomes a real candidate for
Boeing primarily as a financial resource enhancement device, although
market access preservation probably again enters the calculus as well.
With regard to the U.S. commercial airframe producers, it should
also be noted that uniformly they expressed the view that they would
not be motivated to join a multi-national consortium for the benefits
to be derived through any sort of transfer of technology into either
the consortium or into their own organizations. This is consistent
with their attitude that they are preeminent in the world where
product-embodied technology, process technology, and management tech-
niques are concerned and therefore have nothing to gain in these areas
from a "technology-transferring" sort of arrangement with enterprises
in other countries. Similarly, each U.S. firm feels that it could
not benefit from any marketing skills or after-sales support techniques
or programs of non-U.S. aircraft manufacturers and therefore would not
consider this as a motive for participating in a multi-national con-
sortium either. With regard to techno/logy transfer, marketing skills,
and product support, it is important to note that the attitudes of the
several European firms contrast more or less sharply with that of
their U.S. counterparts. The former at least acknowledged that the
latter have skills or intellectual capital in some of these areas, the
32
transfer of which would benefit either themselves or a consortium
20
.to which they were a party, or both.
The motives of the several constituents of the Eruopean air-
frame industry are distinguishable by their ownership characteristics--
nationalized industry (e.g., British Aerospace and Aerospatiale) con-
trasted against essentially private business (e.g., Fokker-VFW), or
mixed enterprise (e.g., Airbus Industrie). Significantly, however,
regardless of.ownership, every European firm has the same top-ranking
motive for seeking a consortium with U.S. participation: more effective
penetration of the U.S. market. Beyond this single point of agreement,
the Europeans diverge. Because the nationalized firms emphasize
employment levels and stability, they regard a consortium as a
better way to attain this goal than independent programs. In contrast,
privately-owned Fokker-VFW did not cite employment as an objective
while Airbus Industrie mentioned it only obliquely. Similary, each
enterprise denied that the maintenance of the labor force was a
motive for considering consortium participation.
From the European standpoint, a consortium is a device that would
permit Europe to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities in the com-
mercial aircraft field. Some admit this is perhaps not a wholly rational
view, but national (and regional) pride is a powerful force in the
formation of consortia with or without U.S. participation.
20It is of some interest to note that three of the four European
firms interviewed appear to feel that there is at least the possibility
of the transfer of some product-embodied technology from U.S. sources
through a consortium, even though U.S. firms and Aerospatiale were strong
in expressing the attitude that product-embodied technology differences
were at a most minimal as between U.S. and European firms. The author
was persuaded that the latter view reflects reality currently but that the
situation may not last (see below pages 45-46).
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Regarding technology transfer, with but one exception the
Europeans either explicitly denied that it was a motive or treated
it as a distinctly subsidiary issue. The exception was British
Aerospace, whose executives explicitly recognized that American air-
frame manufacturers—especially Boeing—are capable of producing
aircraft far more efficiently when the production runs are com-
paratively large—i.'e., in excess of, say, 200 or 300 aircraft.
British Aerospace believes that through a "proper" consortium arrange-
ment with Boeing, for example, it would learn a good deal about how
the U.S. firm manages to achieve such a result. Otherwise, Europeans,
with a few exceptions, maintain that technology transfer in all its
guises is unimportant as a motive to form consortia with or without
U.S. participation. (The next chapter explores this factor more
thoroughly.)
It is also interesting to note that reasons for forming an all-
European consortium differ among the various firms. Once again, for
British Aerospace and Aerospatiale, the two nationalized companies,
employment is clearly the prime objective, while for Fokker-VFW, it is
subsidiary. The private-sector firm is motivated principally by desire
to maintain in the European community a full spectrum of production
capabilities and enjoy some of the benefits of participation in sales
across a wider geographical market such as a consortium can achieve.
34
Summary of Reasons for Forming Consortia
In sum, consortia and similar cooperative efforts are mechanisms
created to respond to logical, strategic, and economic motivations
of each commercial aircraft producer, though the motivations are
often different for each. The U.S. companies are strongly pressured
by the sheer magnitude of financing required to launch a new airframe
project, and they can still participate in what appears to be an
attractive market at an acceptably low threshold cost through con-
21
sortia with other firms. U.S. airframe producers also are under-
standably apprehensive of the growing specter of protectionism in
foreign countries which may severely restrict their traditional access
to the free-world markets.
On the other hand, aircraft manufacturers in other nations look
favorably on consortia with U.S. participation as wedges into the
still-large U.S. airline market. To a lesser extent, they wish to
acquire marketing skills from successful U.S. partners. Usually such
firms will not be satisfied with simple cooperative efforts. They must
participate on a proprietary basis. Consequently, a consortium arrange-
ment is often preferred.
21 It is important to note that a consortium arrangement does not
imply that either the total launching investment or average unit product-
ion costs will be lower than if an efficient individual firm pursued the
same project. In fact, the opposite is almost certain to be the case,
according to the results of the interview program.
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Chapter 3
U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE
U.S. dominance of the free-world commercial aircraft market
rests significantly more on a technological base than on any other.
U.S. companies may not necessarily produce aircraft which exhibit
"better" aerodynamics or structure features than their competitors
are capable of incorporating, but they have been more successful in
implementing and integrating technological advances into products
which are timely and appropriate to the market. In other words, the
U.S. comparative advantage may be found not in the technology of its
airframes, but in the efficiency and effectiveness with which air-
craft are designed, produced, and marketed. This distinction is best
understood if one recognizes the difference between the three basic
types of "technology" relevant to the airframe industry.
First, there is product-embodied technology. Such technology
is manifest through the aircraft supplied by manufacturers. Literally
each element of the aircraft embodies technology, some more advanced
than others--e.g., innovative airfoils, drag-reduction techniques,
high-lift leading-edge devices, light-weight composite materials,
advanced control systems. - -
*
Process technology refers to the combination of means by which
an airframe is produced--the resources and procedures used to build
the aircraft. Again the technology can range from relatively crude to
highly sophisticated, from production on a simple press break to heavy
36
extrusion presses and chemical milling and bonding. The state
of process technology is partially reflected in the inventory of
tools, dies, machines, fabrication and assembly plants, and testing
facilities employed.
Management technology or technique is the third "class" of
technology inevitably associated with airframe design and pro-
duction. Probably because little hardware is evident, it is often
referred to as "soft" technology. Management technique primarily
reflects the skills, procedures, and organization an enterprise
brings to the tasks of assembling, allocating, and controlling its
physical and human capital. While such technology may be characterized
as "soft," increasingly it is backed up by computers which are used
with greater imagination and skill by some managers than by others.
Not every element of technology can be assigned clearly or
solely to one of the three categories. Many represent a blend of
at least two of these classes of technology. For example, the use of
computers to manage paper flows accompanying the assembly of an air-
frame represents a combination of process technology and management
technique. Computer-aided design coupled with computer-controlled
production machine tools exemplifies the linking of all three categories
N!_
of technology. Exhibit 3-1 illustrates how technology can overlap two
or three of the categories.
The remainder of this chapter examines key elements of technology
and focuses principally on those responsible for the U.S. comparative
37
Exhibit 3-1
OVERLAP OF TYPES OF TECHNOLOGIES
Airframe
Technology
(e.g., integrated
computer-aided design
and computer-controlled
manufacture)
Process
Technology
Management
Technique
(e.g., computerized
paper flow control)
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advantage in commercial aircraft. Perhaps most important, it
identifies those technologies which are critical to the maintenance
of this position by the U.S. .
Product-Embodied Technology
Technology embodied in the airframes supplied is the most
visible of the three types. More significant, it is the fastest
moving sort of technology and much of it tends to become obsolete
quickly. Indeed, within the period of time it takes to develop or
obtain and apply many elements of such technology, it may very well
have been surpassed by subsequent technological advances elsewhere.
At present, Americans and Europeans generally agree that their
respective airframe technologies are essentially equivalent. John E.
Steiner, Vice President, Corporate Product Development of the Boeing
Company, recently supported this point by stating: "The fact that we
have done relatively little for some years has placed us in a position
where we, as a nation, have no significant advantage in technology over
1 2 3foreign competitors.' Alan Buley and Henri Ziegler concur that Europe
is on a par with the U.S. in product-embodied airframe technology. Buley
The Boeing Company, Testimony to National Transportation Policy
Study Commission (Seattle: The Boeing Company, August 10, 1977), p. 5.
2
Alan R. Buley, President, Fokker-VFW International, "The Civil
Market: A U.S. European's View," speech presented at Financial Times
Conference "World Aerospace 1977" (Paris, May 31, 1977~T
Henri A. Ziegler, former Chairman, Airbus Industrie, "International
Cooperation in Aerospace Projects: Cooperation Between European In-
dustries and Between Europe and the United States," AIAA 1975 Aircraft
Systems and Technology Meeting, AIAA paper no. 75-1051 (New York:
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1975). 39
holds that the U.S. is probably more adept at exploiting tech-
nological possibilities successfully, but that where basic re-
search is concerned, there is no significant difference. The
European-produced A-300B aircraft, generally acknowledged to be
equivalent to the most advanced subsonic commercial aircraft available
today, supports his contention. When the requisite design and en-
gineering resources are marshaled to do so, Europeans can produce a
high-quality product. This parity with regard to product-embodied
technology partially explains the general U.S. view that the sharing
of product-embodied technology would not often be injurious to the
competitive position of the transferor.
Process Technology
It is clear that process technology is highly prized by all
engaged in the construction of commercial airframes. Most Europeans
interviewed conceded, often enviously, that U.S. firms have superior
process technology (and higher productivity ). Usually, they attri-
buted this advantage to the fact that American managements assume
substantial risk and gear up their production processes for large-
scale programs. Perhaps growing out of their experience with transport
aircraft programs, buttressed by a stress on labor-intensive approaches
-t
to production, Europeans appear unwilling to tool for similarly high
J. M. Ramsden, "Britain's International Aerospace Industry,"
Flight International 112 (October 29, 1977): 1257.
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rates and volume of output. As a result, unit costs for transport
airframes are usually higher in other countries compared with the U.S.
Although a military program, the case of the Lockheed F-104
aircraft illustrates several points about process as distinct from
product. The U.S. Government owned the design and production draw-
ings for this airframe and made them available to several western
nations and Japan. However, the drawings alone were not sufficient;
Lockheed's production know-how was necessary to make possible
relatively efficient and reliable production. Thus, Lockheed came
to license the production process rather than the airframe. Through
these arrangements significant amounts of process technology were
transferred and many licensees learned a great deal about how to
organize inputs for a more efficient and larger production program.
Certainly the F-104 program is a milestone in the history of many
European and Japanese aerospace companies because it improved their
ability to "mass produce" aircraft and aircraft components. Among the
implications of these co-production arrangements are, first, that
5
Referring to a military program, however, one privately owned
European aerospace manufacturer asserts that it can produce aircraft
at least as inexpensively as U.S. firms. It cited a program in which
similar aircraft were produced by both a U.S. company and itself.
The European company, with a lower rate or production, claimed to
have produced them at a lower unit cost than the American firm. They
felt its process was better than the American one. Whether there was
any way this might have been true was not verified.
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process technology is transferable and, second, that such technology
can in the long run be far more valuable to the transferee than
product-embodied airframe technology.
It seems that the United States has worthwhile commercial air-
frame process technology advantages. Many of these advantages stem
simply from the way in which manufacturing processes are organized.
Overall organization of assembly plants is, in the opinion of at
least one prominent aircraft manufacturing executive, the principal
reason that Europeans have generally been unable to compete effectively.
Machines, machine tools, and equipment, in addition to the ways in which
they are combined, are valuable proprietary assets. Also, production
techniques (e.g., "dry" joining methods and laser metal cutting) and
the integration of sophisticated cost control systems (e.g., "management
information systems") have aided in achieving and holding the advantages.
Not surprisingly, U.S. airframe producers seem reluctant to part with
such advantages unless adequately compensated. It is possible that no
price would be high enough to cause a U.S. firm to transfer its best
process technology or production management techniques where commercial
aircraft are concerned. This may or may not be sufficient reason to
doubt that a full and true "partnership" (i.e., consortium) between a
\
major U.S. commercial aircraft producer and one or more foreign concerns
will become a reality, at least in the foreseeable future.
The F-104 example relates to a co-production rather than a con-
sortium arrangement. This illustrates that a consortium is not a sine
qua npn of technology transfer; other arrangements—such as co-production--
can serve as transfer mechanisms. Nonetheless, the consortium is thought
to be the more "powerful" conduit for effecting such transfers, if only
because the transferor has an equity interest in the transferee unlike the
usual co-production situation, especially wherejrrTh'tary programs are
concerned. /-T~T. :
Management Technology
In the opinion of many U.S. aerospace executives, management
"technology" or technique, above all others, is the main reason for
the long-standing and largely unchallenged predominance by U.S.
firms of the free-world commercial aircraft market. Furthermore,
such., executives point out that competitive enterprises outside the
U.S. do not reflect this view of the situation. Certainly, this is
borne out by the interviews GRA conducted in Europe, where the
motive for consortium participation with a U.S. firm which was most
closely related to management technology was expressed as the
acquisition of the U.S. firm's marketing skills.
Undoubtedly, U.S. managerial resources in the aircraft field
are generally superior to those found in other nations where1 aircraft
are built. It is very difficult to pinpoint the reasons this should
be so. In part, such superiority may derive from the long view gen-
erally taken in the U.S. with respect to project and investment decisions
and from a keen sense of corporate responsibility. Concerning the
latter, U.S. aircraft producers are keenly aware that they are in
business to earn money for their stockholders. Thus, they are usually
cost conscious and are willing to trim their work forces if .sales
decline. Long-term profit-maximization (in individual corporate .terms
rather than in national ones) also leads to stress on such aspects as
marketing and after-sales product support.
Certainly stress in these areas, and others, has been more or less
forced (or made necessary) by several external factors impinging upon
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the U.S. aircraft producers. First, the native American market has
always dominated the scene; U.S. firms in the aggregate have
justifiably and optimistically planned to capture the great bulk of
that market. At the same time, the U.S. market is characterized by
substantial competition on both sides. That is, in their home
market the airlines are highly competitive and there are no corporate
ties whatsoever between air carriers and aircraft suppliers, in
contrast to the situation in many other parts of the world. Also,
there is intense competition between the several U.S. aircraft
producers themselves; each recognizes the importance of long-term
happy customer relationships to their own financial viability. It
follows that the U.S. firms have earned a worldwide reputation for
reliably delivering aircraft meeting performance guarantees as a
result of their respective managerial techniques and philosophies which
have contributed mightily to their individual and collective success.
In the actual design and production of aircraft, U.S. manage-
ment "technology" superiority is manifest from the earliest stages
of the design process, where computers aid the exploitation of the
7The view is often expressed that U.S. commercial air frame producers
owe a great deal of their success-in civil programs to military support
of one kind or another. While such "support" is present in some degree
if only because some civil aircraft are adapted to military use, the
effectiveness and value to the aircraft producers of military support
would seem minimal, especially with regard to the launching costs which
loom so large in transport aircraft programs. In fact, the military
establishment has contributed little, if anything (even indirectly),
to the threshold investment required for any U.S. civil jet passenger
transport aircraft of U.S. manufacture that has been offered in the
market to the present.
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scientific and technical information data base, to actual production
where, for example, the routine handling of purchase orders is highly
automated and closely monitored. In fact, the management of paper-
work has a great impact on the efficiency of the entire manu-
facturing process; Boeing, among others, feels that it has developed
a process which has differentiated it favorably from all its
competitors.
Finally, the U.S. advantage in management techniques is augmented
materially by the mobility of the American aerospace workforce with
respect both to location and firm. While the inevitable cycles in the
continuum from conception, to design, to engineering, to production of
transport aircraft occur as new projects start up while others continue
and still others phase out, the locational flexibility of the labor
force has contributed.to the efficiency with which the U.S. airframe
industry as a whole has been able to respond to new challenges and
to innovate.
Relevant Technology
All three categories of technology are of significance to the
U.S. position in the world market for commercial aircraft. This is
true, even for product-embodied technology, despite the general agree-
ment that at present there are few, if any, substantial differences
in this respect between the transport aircraft of various major
countries and companies. The reason is that product-embodied technology
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is relatively fast moving and, while its transfer between firms
and nations, however accomplished, currently poses little competi-
tive threat, it remains important that a nation and its airframe
industry not fall behind in generating technological possibilities
lest it also fall behind competitive firms and nations and find it
difficult, if not impossible, to catch up. For the U.S., this
would seem especially important given the anticipated continued
growth of both domestic and international markets for transport
aircraft, the great balance of payments benefits derived from the
U.S. aircraft industry, and the perishability of those benefits in
a world where other nations have a demonstrated capability to keep
up with the "state-of-the-art" as reflected in product-embodied
airframe technology.
Process technology and management technique may be slower
/
to change than product-embodied technology, but they clearly
underlie the past and present market dominance of the U.S. commercial
aircraft producers. If the Government seeks to influence the degree
of worldwide dominance by the U.S. commercial airframe industry, these
two categories of technology must be included in the scope of public
policy formation and execution, especially where international transfers
o" •
of such technology are involved. -Happily, the interests of the U.S.
The Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology, chaired by J. Fred
Bucy, carefully addressed this same topic and reached a similar con-
clusion. See Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Director,
Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology, An Analysis of Export Control
of U.S. Technology—A POD Perspective (Washington, February 4, 1976).
This report is also known as the "Bucy report."
46
Government and of the U.S. aerospace companies are consonant.
The latter seem to recognize that their competitiveness stems
critically from their enlightened and efficient process and manage-
ment technologies; they do not appear likely to yield their proprie-
tary experience and knowledge simply to serve the ends of inter-
national cooperation. A U.S. airframe manufacturer, if it should
consider joining a multi-national consortium, probably would not
agree to part with any significant quantum of such valuable technological
knowledge and experience.
Still, it behooves the Government to understand the technology
transfer implications of all cooperative arrangements between com-
mercial airframe producers. Only by acquiring an appreciation of
the relationship between the structure and form of consortia (and
other arrangements) and the transfer of technology can government
establish sound public policies and monitor the extent to which they
are being carried out.
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Chapter 4
CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Since U.S. supremacy in the commercial aircraft field is
largely based on the technological superiority of U.S. manufacturers,
it is important to determine the conditions under which technology
transfers are most likely to take place in a consortium setting.
The "technological endowment" of individual consortium members
and the members' ability to absorb technology set limits on the ex-
tent to which technology is transferable. But limits may also be
established at the outset of a consortium by members placing-certain
areas of technology outside the range of their contribution. Such
limitations may come about because of an internal policy of the with-
holding consortium participant or as a result of externally imposed
constraints. In support of the former is the generally held position
of the U.S. commercial airframe producers that they simply will not
"teach" others how to manage an aircraft design and manufacturing
program because they uniformly feel that to do so would be to jeopardize
seriously the competitive position they have so long enjoyed. (Still,
it is difficult to predict what a_U.S. firm might actually do if caught
in a consortium where the difference between success and failure--i.e.,
For detailed discussion of the nature of consortia, see the
Appendix, "Some Characteristics of Cooperative Ventures."
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"profit and loss—rested in its transferring management and
2technology know-how to the consortium.)
Each U.S. airframe executive interviewed also expressed some
doubts about sharing every element of manufacturing process
technology with consortium partners, also for competitive reasons.
All noted the possibilities of externally imposed constraints on
technology transfer as might be imposed by government. The case of
CFM International, an aircraft engine consortium between General
Electric (G.E.) and SNECMA of France, was cited frequently. In
this arrangement, the Department of Defense required that the core
2
It should be pointed out once more that there are differences
between military programs (e.g., the F-104) and civil ones. First,
the former typically are co-production arrangements, not consortia.
As such, the U.S. firm does not often have a profit motivation on
both sides of the technology (or technique) transfer. Second, the
nature of the relationship between transferor and transferee in
military programs is usually quite different from that where a civil
transport aircraft project is approached through a consortium. In
the former situation, the co-production arrangement usually restricts
the transferee's rights to sell aircraft to a finite and limited geo-
graphical market. In such situations, the aggregated customers for
the output—one or more allied governments—also explicitly agree to
limit (or totally throttle) competition with the specific military
product being co-produced. Third, given the nature and purpose of
military programs as contrasted with civil, it is reasonable that a
conventionally-calculated profit yardstick is more difficult to devise
and apply to the former. Put another way, governments purchasing
military hardware often help "front-end" the project and accept the
principle that unit prices must be'such as to provide the producer(s)
with a reasonable rate of return on" their investment in the program.
Rarely, if ever, is such an arrangement made by governments where civil
programs are concerned.
Finally, it seems quite logical to assume that given the preceding
characteristics of military co-production projects, transferors of tech-
nique or technology will not be very forthcoming with proprietary in-
formation (such as related to managerial techniques), especially if they
anticipate such transfer will haunt them subsequently in competitive
markets such as those for civil transport aircraft. Moreover, given the
nature of military programs,it is less likely that the "success" or "failure"
of a co-production program will turn upon the transfer of technology beyond
that just sufficient to build and operate the aircraft.
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of .the CFM-56 engine be provided to the consortium intact by G.E.
so as to minimize transfer of the technology which it embodies.
This example pertains to both design and product-embodied tech-
nologies and establishes a modern U.S. precedent for external con-
trols on technology transfer through multi-national consortia in
aviation. (It remains to be seen if SNECMA will, in fact, acquire the
technology anyway, given the nature of the project and, if so,
whether it matters, given the fast-moving character of such technology.
In any case, the outcome will be instructive and bears watching.)
On the receiving end, if technology in any category is to be
transferred effectively through consortium participation (or otherwise),
a precondition is recognition that such technology is of value to the
receiver. But the interviews, as reflected in Exhibit 2-7, indicated
that where most of the large European aircraft manufacturers are con-
cerned, there is little appreciation of the actual role that technology
has played in placing U.S. producers in a premier position in the market,
particularly with respect to process technology and managerial technique.
It would be prudent, however, to assume that potential foreign commercial
airframe consortium members will increasingly recognize the value and
importance of process and management technology. It is possible that
these more subtle transfers of technology might be achieved in favor of
foreign airframe producers through the use of consultants or by hiring
away personnel from U.S. firms, but the requisite knowledge and ex-
perience has a substantial critical mass and it would take not a few
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people to represent the minimum required. It does not seem likely,
therefore, that this would be a very promising policy for non-
U.S. aircraft companies to pursue. So it is probable that such
technology will be transferred from the U.S., if at all, through
a multi-national consortium or similar cooperative arrangement
where the U.S. Government can probably effect some measure of control
on such transfer, or at least on the conditions precedent to the
establishment of the arrangement. How effective such controls or
conditions would be is not at all clear.
History records that the Government has intervened in such matters
before. Several years ago, negotiations were terminated between a
U.S. airframe manufacturer and a nationalized enterprise behind the
Iron Curtain when the former was constrained by the U.S. Government
in what it could contribute to the project. Specifically, the U.S.
firm seemed prepared to provide airframe design drawings along with
some special tooling for production of the aircraft. However, it was
not willing to contribute specialized manufacturing equipment. Even
if it had been willing to do so, the Government served notice it would
not permit it to establish a complete co-production facility. In other
words, the U.S. firm's contribution was to be limited by the Govern-
"
ment to airframe technology and a limited component of process technology.
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Still another facet of this abortive project is interesting:
A U'.S. supplier of wheels, brakes, and tires was willing to sell these
products to the foreign enterprise but absolutely refused to license
production. The position was based on the U.S. firm's perception that
its primary competitive advantage was its ability to produce high-
quality products at a relatively low cost, employing manufacturing
techniques that had changed but little over the years. It was feared
that transfer of the process technology (rather than sale of the products)
would threaten, or even destroy, its competitive position in world
markets, especially if it came under the control of a foreign entity with
political objectives that might outweigh economic ones (causing predatory
pricing policies which could not be stopped).
In any case, it appears that the technology transfer process in a
consortium arrangement is most profoundly influenced by three factors:
0
 Division of responsibilities among consortium participants,
0
 Duration of the joint enterprise,
0
 Organizational structure.
Division of Responsibilities
Responsibilities within a consortium effort can be allocated in any
pattern as can be observed by contrasting the Concorde and A-300 projects.
In the former, the responsibilities and "risks were divided as equally as
possible between the two parties, British Aircraft"Corp. and Aerospatiale.
An early basic and unusual decision to have full co-production of the
Concorde facilitated the equal distribution of investment and responsibilities.
In the case of Airbus Industrie and its A-300 aircraft, neither risk nor
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responsibilities are equally distributed (except to the extent that
Aerospatiale and Deutsche Airbus are "equals" which is misleading
since the latter actually is made up of several individual German
aerospace firms). With the A-300 project, risk-bearing and value-
added contribution are highly correlated and range from 4.2 percent
for CASA (Spain) to 47.9 percent each for Aerospatiale and Deutsche
Airbus.
In Concorde, technology transfer is said to have been complete
as far as the "partners" were concerned. There were no artifical
barriers erected to impede information flows. The contrast with the
A-300 project seems quite sharp. In part, this reflects the disparity
of participation; perhaps more, however, it is because the division
of responsibilities between the parties is far more clear-cut and
defined as must be the case where the "partners" are not equal and
where co-production is not a characteristic of the consortium. In
the A-300 consortium, the "need-to-know" of other consortium members
is often very restricted, being generally limited to the interface
technology required for the assembly of the final aircraft product.
Although the divisions of responsibilities among the A-300 consortium
members have not been made specif.ically for the purpose of preventing
*.
technology transfer, it appears that in the Airbus type of con-
sortium the transfer of technology (and technique) between the parties
is likely to be minimal, especially in the first years of the consortium
enterprise.
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As reflected in the interviews, the degree of closeness and
parity in a cooperative effort related to commercial airframe
production is the most important determinant of technology transfer
and absorption. As long as responsibilities are allocated discretely
between the partners, the transfer of technological knowledge and
insights passing between them is minimized.
Duration of the Enterprise
The expected life of a consortium is of some importance with
respect to the transfer of technology. Short-lived ventures are
less likely to be the agencies of significant technology transfer
than consortia founded on the expectation of long-term existence
and viability. Clearly the time over which peop-le interact plays a
significant role in the amount and "quality" of technology transfer
that takes place.
It is worth noting, however, that a consortium without a finite
life—perhaps a consortium without, a mandate dependent on a specific
mission—may come to act independently of its constituent "partners"
and thus may ultimately lead to the erection of barriers to technology
transfer between the consortium and those "partners.11 Therefore, with
respect to duration, technology transfer and diffusion are probably
maximized in consortia where only a" specific long-term mission is
being pursued with substantial intellectual interactions all along the
way between personnel drawn from the "partners." (Transfer is probably
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further facilitated if these personnel are rotated frequently
between the consortium and parent.)
Organizational Structure
Each cooperative venture must have a structure which defines
ownership, management, and decisionmaking authority. The structure
will influence the transfer of technological possibilities and
know-how. In part, this is because technology transfer is signific-
antly a function of the nature and extent of the interactions between
people. Therefore, to the degree the organizational structure of
the enterprise influences such personnel interactions, it will also
influence the amount, character, and efficiency with which technology
is transferred both within the corporate enterprise and between
it and the firms which established it.
Management structure in a commercial aircraft consortium can be
quite complex—e.g., the Airbus Industrie consortia. As the size and
complexity of a consortium's, management increase, so do the amounts of
personal interaction. Especially where executives are drawn from
various consortium partners, the likelihood of the transfer of tech-
•3
nology is increased. Such transfer is accelerated if there is a prc
grammed rotation of such personnel at relatively frequent intervals.
3
The Bucy report, in effect, confirms this finding by declaring
that "The more active the relationship [of cooperating partners], the
more effective the transfer mechanism." Defense Research and Engineering,
p. 4. .
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Moreover, if a consortium is established pursuant to a major
innovative long-term project such as Airbus Industrie, in time
it may well assume an identify of its own and become the principal
technology transferee rather than a conduit for the passage of
technological intelligence between consortium partners.
For other reasons, a cooperative arrangement organized on the
basis of contractual obligations (e.g., Fokker F-28), rather than a-s
a separate corporate entity (e.g., Airbus Industrie), may be less
likely to catalyze the transfer of technology other than of the pro-
duct-embodied (e.g., airframe) variety—the least "dangerous" form of
technology. That is, in the former case, the only technology trans-
ferred is that conveyed through the contractual arrangement (such as a
sub-contract to produce wings) as contrasted with the latter where
there is day-to-day interaction between personnel with a wide variety
of skills and backgrounds drawn from an assortment of consortium
members.
In another variant, a consortium might be organized in such a way
that each "partner" contributes capital but only a limited number of
such "partners"--perhaps only one--dominates the decisionmaking pro-
cess. In such consortia, control of the enterprise may well rest with
the consortium participant responsible for conceptualizing and assembling
%
the final aircraft product. This is especially true where such a
"partner" has made a disproportionately large capital and risk commit-
ment to the effort. In any case, technology is likely to be passed
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between consortium "partners" only to the extent that they must
interact in the production of the final product. It follows that
cooperative arrangements are most likely to result in technology
transfers between the "partners" where there is approximate parity
of commitment, resources, and general management responsibility
where the consortium is concerned.
In sum, the structure of the organization of a cooperative
venture in the aircraft field can very well influence the quantity
and character of the technology which is transferred, as well as
timing. Nevertheless, further research is required to determine with
greater precision just how important a role in technology transfer is
played by the organizational ^ structure of cooperative endeavors.•
Implications
What sort of consortium, then, is most likely to generate minimal
technology transfer? The key variable would likely be the extent of
the division of defined responsibilities between each participant.
Each would have to perform a specialized task (or tasks) requiring
minimum amounts of technological communication with the other partici-
pants. This factor was illustrated in one interview in which the A-300
program was discussed; it was said that the only thing Aerospatiale
knows about the wing technology is the first few" centimeters—the
knowledge required to effect the wing-fuselage junction in assembly.
Apparently none of the consortium participants knows the intimate details
of the wing's technology or, more important, the process and management
technologies used to manufacture it.
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The management structure of the minimum-transfer consortium
would be decentralized with respect to development and production,
but not necessarily marketing. It would help thwart transfers if
the consortium had a short time horizon and the relationships between
the parties were determined more through bilateral contracts than
through a formal, quasi-independent organization. It is highly
probable, however, that many prospective consortium members—especially
those seeking approximately equal sharing by all parties—would balk
at such an organization, not necessarily on grounds of lessened
technology transfer probabilities but because the arrangement is not
consistent with large financial commitments being made in the context
of a technologically complex product.
A consortium enterprise maximizing technology transfer would be
one in which the division of responsibilities was broad and somewhat
overlapping. For example, consortium-member team efforts would
characterize the program. A jointly designed and operated production
facility would enhance technology transfer. General management structure
would be centralized and participant executives would move between the
consortium and the partners' organizations with moderate frequency. The
anticipated duration would be considerable, such as the life cycle of
\
one aircraft-type program which implies a decade or more.
Consortia can be established in such a way as either to maximize
or minimize the transfer of process technology and management technique
as well as product-embodied technology. But no consortium to date
appears to have been formed in such a way as to catalyze significantly
58
technology transfer of any kind. Before determining the pro-
priety of a particular consortium from a public policy standpoint,
it is. important to ascertain not only whether or not it appears
likely to result in the transfer of technology but also whether
or not such transfer would be inimical to the national interest.
Such an evaluation should take into account the three conditions
which must be met if the transfer of technology is to be harmful:
0
 Actual foreign adoption of uniquely U.S. product-
embodied technology, process, or management
techniques,
0
 Translation of the transferred technology into a
significantly improved competitive position for a
non-U.S. firm,
0
 A determination that the net effect of such in-
creased foreign competition is detrimental for the
U.S. interest in some sense.
The third condition is the most critical. Determination of the
net effect of increased foreign competition in the commercial airframe
field is complex. The next chapter examines many of the critical
tradeoffs involved in such a determination.
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Chapter 5
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The creation or expansion of the scope of consortia for the pro-
duction of commercial airframes is one of the more likely means of
achieving rationalization in the aircraft industry. This holds for
the U.S. and elsewhere. In Europe, the trend towards consortia
appears well established with the Concorde project and, more recently,
the A-300 (Airbus Industrie), both of which are multi-national ven-
tures.
The present chapter is concerned with the public policy issues
and implications of the multi-national commercial airframe consortium.
In order to consider these implications in some detail, however, it
is necessary to look at consortia more generally. Therefore, as
necessary, this chapter will consider (a) multi-national airframe
consortia with U.S. participation, (b) multi-national consortia with-
out U.S. participation, and (c) all-U.S. consortia. The U.S. public
policy issues which will be addressed in some measure include:
0
 Technology Transfer,
0
 Employment,
0
 '. Balance-of-Payments, -. .
t,'
0
 Military Capability,
Rationalization" is defined as "the organization of a business or
industry upon an orderly system, to avoid waste, to simplify procedure,
to co-ordinate various parts, etc."; Webster 's New International Diction-
ary, 2nd ed. (unabridged), 1961.
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Foreign Relations,
Market Access for U.S. Firms,
Access to U.S. Markets by Non-U.S. Firms,
Competition in Transport Aircraft Markets.
Government Interest
The government has a vital interest in the commercial airframe
industry for several reasons. First, the industry has for some time
been the second largest contributor to the credit side of the U.S.
2balance-of-trade account. Second, the industry's work force and
capital investments are valuable national defense assets. Third,
airframe industry performance and behavior is ultimately reflected in
the character and efficiency of the air transport network of the U.S.
and of much of the rest of the world.
In part, the government's interest is manifest by its involve-
ment in the industry through:1
0
 Sponsorship and financing of research, development,
- and testing of new techniques and technologies;
0
 Application of antitrust policies and laws;
0
 Military use of same or similar airframe for
routine and/or ernergency_lift.
\
0
 Participation in special financing arrangements;
0
 Civil Aeronautics Board regulation and promotion
of airlines;
0
 Federal Aviation Administration certification of air-
craft airworthiness, promotion of safety, and main-
tenance of the airport-airways system;
2Steiner, "The Eighteen Months that Matter," p. 24. 61
0
 Controls over exports of certain aerospace technologies.
Certainly, then, government is concerned with the financial condition
and long-term viability of the airframe producers. Since the cost
structure of the industry continues to change in fundamental ways
(as discussed in the initial part of Chapter 2 above), and because
this gives rise to the 'need for industry rationalization which, in
time, carries with it myriad implications for public policy, the
concept of economic rationalization is appropriately considered at
this point.
Rationalization of the Commercial Airframe Industry
The Concept
Any change in the structure of an industry can reflect the pro-
cess of rationalization, though this need not be the case. Structural
changes usually are manifest through changes in any or all of the
following:
0
 Number of firms in an industry,
0
 Relationships between such firms,
0
 Sizes of firms,
0
 Rates of change in firm size,
0
 Character of firms (e.g., <extent and rate of integration,
both horizontal and vertical).
Rationalization typically occurs in response to changing basic con-
ditions of supply (such as cost structure) or demand (such as being shut
out of a significant part of the market by non-economic forces--e.g.,
politics). Some rationalization is often required, at least over the
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economic long run. Even though rationalization generally promotes
a more stable and profitable configuration for an industry, this in
and of. itself should not be grounds for suspecting that it also runs
counter to the public interest. In part, the antitrust laws were
developed to deal with those changes in the structure of an industry
which appear to undermine the public interest.
Most often, the need for industrial rationalization can be traced
to a changing structure of costs, usually related to technological
change in an industry, sometimes itself accelerated by changing
relative prices of labor and capital. This situation seems to obtain
in the commercial airframe industry, both in the U.S. and elsewhere.
With regard to costs in this industry, it is clear that threshold
and fixed costs continue to rise. (See Exhibits 2-1, 2-2, and 2-4.)
This change in the industry's cost structure is one cause of the
dwindling number of airframe manufacturers worldwide; with such changes
in the production function, the size of the market has simply not been
large enough to support the number of aircraft suppliers of earlier
years. Thus, firms such as General Dynamics dropped out of the
market as prime contractors and others have merged or have been nation-
alized, or both. The trend towards capital intensity in aircraft
manufacturing appears to be continuing "today.
Profits are not guaranteed, however, as inefficiency, poor
managerial decisions, assumption of excessive risks, or general
economic conditions can cause a producer to suffer a loss.
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Mechanisms of Rationalization
In the commercial transport airframe industry, rationalization
requires a move towards an industry structure in which each manu-
facturer produces aircraft with unique payload/range capabilities
4
and operating cost characteristics. Each aircraft type would have
a defined place in the spectrum of transport aircraft offered,
although, at the margins, it would compete with other aircraft, each
of which would display different payload/range capabilities and costs,
Such a market structure would remain oligopolistic as at present;
also, it would promote efficient production and reasonable pricing
to the extent.that effective competition were present.
Rationalization of this industry can be accomplished through one
or a combination of the following mechanisms:
0
 Consortia;
0
 Withdrawal from the commercial transport market (e.g.,
Glenn L. Martin, Convair, and Canadair);
0
 Bankruptcy;
0
 .Horizontal merger (e.g., consolidation of McDonnell and
Douglas, and of all independent British firms into
British Aerospace);
0
 Vertical merger (such as would be exemplified by a
consolidation of, sayf. Northrop and Boeing, or Douglas
and Rohr); . *
0
 Conglomerate merger (as would be illustrated by an
amalgamation of, say, Fokker-VFW and Bayer, or of
Lockheed and Textron);
4
See Chapter 2 above, pages 9 through 35.
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0
 Prime-subcontractor relationship (as manifest in the
Fokker F-28 and Douglas DC-10 programs, among others,
where sometime primes serve as subcontractors to other
airframe manufacturers);
0
 Licensing (e.g., British Aerospace's licensing of the
Rumanian state aircraft manufacturer for the co-
production of the BAG 111-475);5
0
 Public ownership (e.g., Aerospatiale and British
Aerospace, owned by the French and British govern-
ments, respectively);
0
 Government subsidization of existing enterprises,
direct or indirect;
0
 Other public-sector assistance to existing enter-
prises (e.g., the Emergency Loan Guarantee to Lockheed).
While this discussion is largely concerned with consortia., much of what
will be discussed with respect to the public policy implications will
apply (in varying degrees) to other means of rationalizing the air-
frame industry.
Clearly, the government's great interest in the commercial airframe
industry requires that it play some role in any substantial rationalize-
\'
tion. The extent of government involvement will depend, first, on
how the government perceives the effects of rationalization on the
public interest. Next, from the array of possible governmental actions
or programs, some will be chosen and some eschewed, depending on
what is needed to protect or to atlvanqe the public interest in the
specific situation. The mechanisms may be industry-specific (such as
some of those appearing in the list just above), or they may be more
"Britain's International Aerospace Industry: Commercial,"
Flight International 112 (October 29, 1977): 1266.
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general but nonetheless applicable to certain sorts of airframe
rationalization situations. Tax policy, tax rulings and antitrust
posture are examples of the latter sort of mechanism available to
government.
"Pre-eminence," "Predominance,"and U.S. Public Policy
The 1976 report of the Subcommittee on Aviation and Transport-
ation R&O of the Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S.
House of Representatives (the "Mil-ford Subcommittee") entitled
The Future of Aviation recommended that:
National policy must clearly declare that
maintenance of the United States' pre-
eminence in aeronautics is absolutely vital
to the national interest.
The report also calls upon U.S. public policy to be such as to ensure
maintenance of "our worldwide commercial leadership" in air trans-
portation. Thus, it can be concluded that the Subcommittee is urging
upon the Congress (and upon the public) the policies and steps
necessary to guarantee U.S. pre-eminence in the field of aviation to
support its predominance in the market for commercial transport aircraft.
Neither the report nor the hearings on which it was based ascribe
any precise meaning to "pre-eminence." According to the dictionary,
"pre-eminence" refers to "excellence...distinction above others in
quality." "Predominance" is meant'-to'convey superiority in "strength...
position " and "exceeding in number." In the present context, then,
' U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation
R&D, The Future of Aviation, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. , 1976, Vol. I, p. 1.
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f,
"preeminence" is characterized by superiority in knowledge and
intellectual capital; "predominance" is more concerned with the
marketplace, specifically as in the production and sale of a sub-
stantial majority of the world's transport aircraft. The Milford Sub-
committee Report plainly wishes to assure that the United States remains
both preeminent and predominant where commercial transport air-
craft are concerned.
In high technology fields, preeminence often supports pre-
dominance, though this need not be the case. The British, for ex-
ample, consider themselves preeminent in the large aircraft turbine
8
engine field; they clearly are not predominant in this area. In.any
event, it is reasonable to suggest that a public policy "requiring" that
the United States maintain its preeminence in the field of aviation
may not be enough to ensure long-term U.S. predominance in the market.
The reverse is also true, at least in the short run.
In aviation it is probable that continued technological leader-
ship (in process technology and management technique as well as in product-
embodied technology) —i.e., preeminence —is a necessary condition for
long-term predominance in the free world aviation market. It follows,
then, that continued U.S. preeminence in aviation generally, and in
the transport aircraft field in particular, reflects sound public policy.
While the Subcommittee report does not mention predominance per se,
pages 1 through 8 of Vol. 1, for example, clearly point to the desirability
of maintaining a leadership positron in the market place. On page 6, for
example, the Subcommittee says: "In the past, the American aircraft in-
dustry has maintained world 'preeminence' because of superior technology,
better manufacturing processes, extensive marketing and servicing organ-
izations and extremely reliable equipment, all of which have combined to
produce superior aircraft at lower prices. Retention of these factors
is necessary to insure U.S. dominance." (emphasis added) Ibid., p. 6.
o
This report makes no judgment as to the accuracy of this
perception.
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This issue is not quite as simple where market predominance is
concerned. The U.S. is not nearly as much the master of its fate in
the marketplace as it is in the maintenance and expansion of its
stock of intellectual capital in aviation science and technology.
The U.S. is facing increasing competition for its present market
9share—approximately 85 percent —in the commercial transport field.
Consequently, rationalization of the airframe industry is not merely
a domestic issue but is one which encompasses at least the entire
free world as far as the U.S. policymakers are concerned. Powerful
forces are threatening the current level of U.S. market predominance.
The U.S. Government clearly does not possess the power to establish
directly and unilaterally the free world market share of U.S. firms,
but it does have the ability to help maintain an environment in which
U.S. firms have the best chance to perform in a manner consistent
with the public interest.
To what extent, then, should the U.S.., as a matter of public
policy, seek continued predominance in the world market for transport
aircraft as measured by some finite substantial percentage established
by an appropriate public process? Establishing a clear position on this
issue is important because such a policy will influence, if not determine,
policy in other areas such as rationalization, antitrust, technology transfer,
employment, and balance-of payments. There are implications in this issue for
the consortium concept as well. For example, because of the changing
function of the commercial airframe industry, consortia may well be a
promising and important means of achieving rationalization in support
of continued U.S. market predominance. On the other hand, if the share
9U.S. Congress, The Future-of Aviation, Vol., p. 9.
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of the market to be enjoyed by U.S. commercial airframe producers
as a whole is to be something less than it has been in. the past,
this would heighten the need for U.S.-industry rationalization and may
require earlier consideration of the consortium alternative than would
otherwise be the case.
•The link between preeminence in the field of aviation and con-
sortia is substantially less direct and critical than is the link
between market predominance and consortia under a scenario as now
seems to be unfolding in the free world. Preeminence can 'generally
be assured with relatively modest investments of public resources if
there are no other means. But preeminence, in any case, is recognized
by the Mil ford Subcommittee as a desirable attribute for the United
States to maintain, even if the United States' commercial airframe
industry is characterized by fewer suppliers than at present, by
consortia, or by any other post-rationalization configuration. Pre-
dominance, on the other hand, may not be so easily maintained (even,
at, say, the 70 or 75 percent level) if necessary industry rational-
ization is thwarted because such rationalization is not seen to be
required to support U.S. market participation on the higher level.
It follows, then, that if preeminence and predominance are to be ex-
plicit goals of U.S. public policy, as the Mil ford Subcommittee urges, it
t_
will be necessary for all those involved in puolic policy formulation
and execution to maintain currency with both supply-side and demand-side
conditions in the commercial airframe field throughout the world.
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Moreover, such policies and policy administration must reflect
the realities of the future rather than conditions of the past.
None of the foregoing, however, is meant to suggest that it
is clear that the future best interests of the United States are
served by policies, programs, and practices which lead to continuation
or expansion of the current U.S. share of the market for commercial
transport aircraft. There are arguments that suggest that the U.S.
would be prudent to accept a lower share in this market. It is not
possible to resolve such issues in the present analysis; it is
possible only to point out that those responsible for enunciating
and administering U.S. policy should be aware that "predominance"
of the market at a lower level than the present approximate 85 percent
might prove to be in the best long-run interests of the United States,
even though such a reduction in U.S. market participation might lead
to the formation of consortia, both in the U.S. and abroad, as part
of an overall rationalization process.
No matter how the market predominance issue is resolved, one of
the central factors which will profoundly influence the structure
of the U.S. airframe industry is antitrust policy and practice in
the United States.
Antitrust Barriers to Consortia
"
*.
Among the most significant barriers to the formation of consortia
as a means of rationalizing and strengthening the U.S. airframe in-
dustry are those related to antitrust policy. The type of joint
ventures considered in this study have few precedents; therefore, it
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•is difficult to predict the degree to which they would comply with
antitrust policy and law as they have developed. There are two
major criteria, however, by which the anticompetitive effects of
joint ventures in general are judged.
First is the concept of "potential competitors." If it can be
shown that, in the absence of a joint venture, the participants
would have competed with one another independently, then the joint
venture or consortium is considered to be anticompetitive and prob-
ably illegal under antitrust law.
A second criterion applied to joint ventures concerns the notion
of a de facto merger. Although the agreement which forms the basis for
the consortium may limit both its term and its activities, the limited
cooperation inherent in the consortium can provide an ideal starting
point for cooperation (or collusive behavior) in other areas. The
consortium, as laid out by the specific terms of the agreement which
governs it, may not be illegal in itself. However, if it provides the
opportunity for illegal cooperation, it may not be acceptable. In its
extreme-form, cooperation between consortium partners may lead to what
is, in fact, a merger. That such a merger is a de facto result of a
consortium would not exempt it from antitrust law.
A firm contemplating a potentially unacceptable course may seek
to take advantage of the Business Review Procedure of the Department
of Justice. Under this procedure "the Department may issue a statement
of enforcement intention with respect to a specific pending transaction."10
10United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Anti-
trust Guide for International Operations, revised (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, March 1 , 1977), p . . 1 . 7 1
Participation by a firm in this procedure requires that it make full
disclosure about the contemplated activity. A positive opinion by
the Justice Department, however, does not grant a permanent exemption
from prosecution. "Even under this procedure the Department always
reserves the right to institute civil proceedings if it subsequently
wishes to test the legality of the practices concerned." In
addition, a statement that it does not intend to prosecute may be
withdrawn if it develops that there has been less than full disclosure
or if deception has been practiced by the firm in its request for the
12Department's opinion.
Thus, with regard to the formation of airframe consortia, anti-
trust considerations could have a restraining effect at three stages.
First, legal counsel to the prospective participants in a consortium
could find that such involvement would be illegal through an analysis
of decisions in similar cases, by examining such Justice Department
publications as the Antitrust Guide for International Operations, or
by having informal conversations with Justice Department personnel.
Second, such firms might receive a negative opinion under the Business
Review Procedure. Finally, if they proceeded with the consortium, the
Justice Department could investigate and, perhaps, litigate.
Under current policy and procedure, the Justice Department's
attitude towards specific consortia to produce commercial airframes
will not be known until either: (a) potential participants file under the
11
 A.D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A.: A Study of Competi-
tion Enforced by Law, 2nd ed.[Cambridge, England:Cambridge University
Press,1970), p. 382.
12
 Ibid., pp. 382-383.
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Business Review Procedure (in which case the answer, if positive,
would not necessarily be final), or (b) action is brought against
such a consortium. In either case, months—even years—of delay are
involved, which in itself could be a powerful discouraging factor when
and if cooperative arrangements in the nature of consortia are a res-
ponse to production or market conditions. It is not entirely clear
that either a high degree of such uncertainty or such great delays are
necessary to the administration of the antitrust laws—especially if
arrangements such as consortia in this field are in the public interest,
as seems increasingly likely given the changing cost structure of air-
frame production. The industry problems would be eased greatly if
the Justice Department were to find the means for making known its
general views of such matters so they can be challenged or relied
upon, as appropriate, even in advance of an actual proposed venture.
At the very least, considerable relief might be afforded if Justice
were to consider strengthening the language incorporated in the "product"
of the Business Review Procedure, perhaps with the "no-action letter"
of the Internal Revenue Service serving as a model.
Although it has yet to be tested in the court, the Department of
Justice holds that its jurisdiction is not diminished when a multi-
national consortium involving U.S. enterprise is the issue rather than
an all-U.S. arrangement of similar character. This was emphasized by
the then-Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Thomas E. Kauper,
in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Aviation and Transporta-
tion Research and Development, when he said that, "in terms of the
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antitrust laws, the fact that a participant in a joint venture happens
13to be a foreign firm usually has no inherent significance." The
important consideration for the Justice Department is the effect of
a consortium on competition in domestic markets; the inclusion of a
foreign participant implies no special consideration, either positive
or negative, according to the Department of Justice.
The competitive impact of any proposed cooperative arrangement
will be gauged by the Department of Justice primarily by its treat-
ment of the technology transfer issue and by the extent to which
market competition in the U.S. between commercial airframe producers
is foreclosed.
Transfer of Techno!ogy--Techno1ogy transfer is directly affected
by antitrust law primarily through patents and licensing agreements. .
Any or all three categories of technology considered in this report
(design, process, and management technique) might be the subjects of
such agreements. Nevertheless, a provision pertaining to the transfer
of managerial techniques would likely prove difficult to move against in
~ah antitrust context because the law has generally not viewed such
ephemeral factors as impermissable instrumentalities of monopolization.
(Indeed, superiority of management is often a successful defense against
antitrust charges.) • v
Arrangements which transfer technology in a consortium setting
are ancillary to its main purpose. Most antitrust cases dealing with
patents or licensing refer to situations in which the patent or
license is central to the questioned activity. However, general prin-
ciples applicable in these instances may also be relevant to consortia.
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••• U.S. Congress, The Future of Aviation, p.. 540,-
In essence, a patent is a grant of a monopoly, one which is
defined by a specific technology or method of production. A license
to' use patented information also carries with it a degree of
monopoly power typically assigned within a geographic region. The
trade-off in public policy which antitrust law addresses in the area
of patents is between encouraging innovation (by allowing innovators
to derive economic benefits from their activities), and making sure
that there is sufficient access to technological information to
promote competition.
The specific manner in which each consortium handles the trans-
fer of technology from one partner to another will vary. (Some al-
ternatives are discussed in the attached Appendix.) In general, the
reasoning the Justice Department can be expected to employ with re-
gard to this issue is indicated by one of Mr. Kauper's statements
before the Subcommittee in the "Future of Aviation" hearings. He
pointed out that "as joint activities move away from the voluntary,
open exchange of information'-toward agreements which directly affect
the rights, properties, or competitive actions of competitors, anti-
14trust problems are more likely to arise." This does not provide
much to base plans on, however, given the very 'general nature of the
observation.
•t
Market Competition—Of greatest interest to the antitrust authori-
ties would be the inf luence of consortia (or other cooperative arrange-
ments) on market competi t ion.
14
 I b i d . , p. 538,
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'- . Whether or not the anti-competitive effects of the formation
of an airframe consortium would be unacceptable depends upon the
definition of the "relevant market." Such a definition involves two
interdependent issues: delineation of the product through which
the "relevant market" is defined and determination as to what firms
could reasonably be expected to compete in such a market absent
the arrangement in question. With respect to the latter issue, the
Justice Department would make a judgment as to what firms have both
sufficient resources and the desire to develop and produce a new
airframe for the "relevant market."
As for the issue of product definition, as noted in Chapter 2,
important considerations include range and capacity (payload) rela-
tionships. If a consortium were formed to produce an airframe with
certain payload-range characteristics, a determination would be made
as to what degree other existing or planned airframes could be viewed
as substitutes by airlines. A total market dominance would be said
to exist if a single enterprise were to produce a jet aircraft with
a payload/range combination sufficiently differentiated that no other
could be considered a substitute. Such total market dominance ("100
percent concentration at the one-firm level") is not a likely occur-
rence but a very high degree of concentration is likely. In fact,
however, a high degree of concentration (but not 100 percent) does
not preclude there being effective competition in the marketplace!
one example, among many others is the U.S. automobile industry.
The importance of market definition cannot be over estimated
where the public policy (i.e., anti-competitive) effects of consortia
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are to be gauged. For example, in an entirely hypothetical example,
assume that the L-1011 and DC-10 in at least some versions are
defined as serving the same "relevant market," as seems reasonable
given their payload-range characteristics, and their capital and oper-
ating costs. Further assume that these two firms form a consortium
to develop a single new aircraft which is both larger and longer ranging
than either the L-1011 or the DC-10. In such an instance, concern
would surely be expressed as to whether this consortium's very ex-
istence would reduce competition between the two firms in the DC-10/
L-1011 context. Is the new consortium aircraft in the same "relevant
market" as the present tri-jets and, if so, will the consortium arrange-
ment tend to suppress competition between the partners (as couched in
terms of the DC-10 and L-1011) or to enhance competition by affording
customers another choice in the market? . .
Linked to market definition in any attempt to ascertain a con-
sortium's influence on market competition is a determination of the
events that would occur were the consortium not to be formed. Using
the same example as before, the issue would turn on what expectations
the government had as to the independent actions of Douglas and Lock-
heed without the joint venture. Would they each have proceeded with
a similar new aircraft? Would one .of them have done so? If the answer
\
to either question were "yes," the Justice Department might look with
disfavor on the consortium. But if the answer to both were "no,"
the consortium might be welcomed not only as providing additional
choices in the market, but also as providing a new competitive foil
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for aircraft produced by others (such as Boeing and its B-747SP, or
the product of a foreign firm). Exhibit 5-1 spells out the most
likely alternative "scenarios" through which either a multi-national
consortium with U.S. participation or an all-U.S. airframe consortium
might come into being. The exhibit also summarizes the anticipated
possible competitive effects accompanying each'case. It is extremely
important to note the extent to which the competitive effects are
uncertain and hinge upon judgment about future events taking place
or not. Even if time and other resources are devoted to reducing the
uncertainties, the competitive effects remain largely indeterminate
ex ante where airframe consortia are concerned, especially in the long-
run where it counts most. What seems clear is that given the nature
of the commercial airframe production process at present and in the
foreseeable future, consortia—multi-national or otherwise—have at least
as great a likelihood of enhancing competition as thwarting it.
Implications of Antitrust Policies—Given the economic character
of the commercial airframe industry, it is entirely possible that at
"some point in the future no present independent U.S. firms would be both
willing and able to respond to demand for a next generation of commercial
transport aircraft. If such were the case, antitrust policy might well
present a significant barrier to the introduction of new technology.
Moreover, if non-U.S. aircraft producers were already in this market,
there might well be less competition with U.S. representation in the
market thus restricted. In any event, the legal requirements for "proving"
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that a consortium with a considerable degree of monopoly power is
the only viable market participant may be sufficient to prevent
a sound economic case from being translated into a sound legal one.
The comments by the Justice Department on the application by
Eastern Air Lines for authority to discuss design features of new
aircraft with other carriers provides insight concerning the Antitrust
Division's attitude toward the rationalization of the airframe in-
dustry. Underlying a significant portion of Eastern's argument is
the notion that the market will no longer support competition between
two new aircraft that are near-perfect substitutes. Eastern fears
"the spectre of a repeat of current wasteful duplication of wide-body
aircraft types.' 5 For the most part, Justice disregards this argument.
The Antitrust Division instead is concerned that as a result of
Eastern's proposal "competitive new aircraft types, such as the three
models of the wide-body jets, could not be developed."16 This implies
the Department is not presently receptive to the suggestion that there
may be need for airframe industry rationalization without which effective
market competition may be reduced in the long term even if not in the
near future.
15U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board., Comments of Eastern Air Lines, Inc.:
The Nature of the Circumstances that Prompted Eastern to Request Discussion
Authority, Application of Eastern Air Lines for Discussion Authority,
Docket 29439 (Washington, D.C., September 24, 1976), p. 3.
16
 U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Comments of the United States De-
partment of Justice, Application of Eastern Air Lines for Discussion
Authority, Docket 29439 (Washington, D.C., October 8, 1976), p. 6.
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Certain areas of the economy, such as organized labor, public
utilities, some regulated transport carriers and agriculture, -enjoy
some degree of legislative immunity from antitrust prosecution.
Although the airframe business does not approach the size of these
components of U.S. industry, an important public policy question appears
to be whether any industry displaying comparable cost characteristics
should also be treated with special antitrust consideration on the
grounds that in the production of a particular type of aircraft, over
the relevant range of output, the manufacturers now exhibit a
fundamental attribute of natural monopoly--!' .e., a single firm can
produce the given airframe at ever-lower cost as it moves further down
18the long-run average cost curve. - The point is that antitrust policy
which serves the nation's interests will be sensitive to such con-
ditions and reflect an understanding of the situation sufficiently
early to avoid setting the stage for reduced market competition and all
that would follow in terms of aircraft prices, adverse U.S. balance-of-
payments effects, etc.
Technology Transfer
The Export Administration Act states that:
Rules and regulations under this subsection may pro-
vide for denial of any request or ..application for authority
to export articles, materials, or supplies, including
technical data or any other information, from the United
immunities of these and other sectors are described in
A.D. Neal-e, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A., pp. 5-9.
18See Exhibit 5-1 and Chapter 2.
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States, its territories and possessions, to any nation or
combination of nations threatening the national security
of the United States if the President determines that
their export would prove detrimental to the national
security of the United States.'9
This Act, along with the Arms Export Control Act, addresses the need
to prevent technology of possible military significance from becoming
available to potential adversaries.
Any U.S. firm which seeks to participate in a multi-national con-
sortium must obtain a license from the Office of Export Administration
of the Department of Commerce. These licenses are granted pursuant to
the Export Administration Act. In dealing with application for licenses,
the Office consults the Inter-Agency Operating Committee-on which sit
representatives of the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and
Energy, and the. CIA. In matters pertaining to aviation, NASA and the
FAA are also consulted.
As long as a U.S. participant in a multi-national airframe con-
sortium does not propose to use or contribute military-oriented tech-
nology, a .consortium project of this nature should have little dif-
ficulty receiving Commerce approval. Approval by the Committee of
arrangements involving only non-Communist venturers is seldom denied,
even though some constraints on technology transfer may be imposed
where military technology is perceived to be a part of the transaction.
19U.S. Congress, Senate and House, An Act to Amend the Export
Administration Act of 1969: Export Administration Amendments of 1977,
95th Cong., P.L. 95-52 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 22, 1977), p. 91.
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The case of CFM International, previously discussed, illustrates
this latter point.
In any event, the requirement for an "export license" indicates
that significant safeguards against the transfer of technology with
military importance already exist.
Technology transfer is only a public policy concern—apart from
antitrust issues—if the consortia in which U.S. firms participate
are multi-national. In such a case, national security considerations
historically have been of greatest concern to policymakers and, as
just discussed, the current review and licensing process at least
provides a safeguard mechanism. In contrast, however, there has been
only modest concern for the long-run commercial significance of inter-
national transfers of technology. Such concern is manifest primarily
through constraints such as those placed upon "hot section" technology
transfer in the U.S./French CFM-56 consortium and, more generally, in
the "for early domestic distribution" (FEDD) approach taken with
respect to certain data and information developed by or for the gov-
ernment.
As elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4, it seems that the transfer
of commercial airframe technology (i.e., "product-embodied technology")
through consortium arrangements is-not an important public policy issue:
\
i.
first, the United States does not have a clear advantage in this area;
second, any advantage which a foreign firm might gain from such a
transfer would be short-lived; and third, U.S. firms participating in
such consortia would be as likely to receive technology as to transfer
it. The conclusion is not the same for production process technology
and for management technique, however. Still, the U.S. would be
harmed by the transfer of these types of technology only if (1) the
foreign recipients were willing and able to exploit them; (2) by making
use of them, they were able to improve their competitiveness with U.S.
industry; and (3) if such increased competitiveness on the part of
foreign firms were considered, on balance, to be harmful to the U.S.
In assessing the effect on the U.S. of policies which would
enable overseas airframe manufacturers to increase their share of the
market, it is necessary to examine some of the factors which might
balance the losses which the U.S. airframe industry would suffer.
The first of these relates to the promotion of domestic political
stability among U.S. allies in Europe and/or Japan. The strengthening
of national economies through expansion of the European or Japanese
airframe industry would contribute to political stability because
economic factors, especially employment, have proved to be important
determinants of such stability. It is doubtful, however, whether
this alone is a sufficient reason to promote technology transfer in
the transport aircraft field, especially if it might subsequently
undermine a U.S. firm's competitive position.
A second possible result'of promoting international airframe
technology transfer to U.S. allies is to enhance (or maintain) their
capacity to produce sophisticated military equipment. While a stronger
European (or Japanese) airframe industry would be better able to
accomplish this task, it would appear that a more effective approach
would involve joint or co-production of military aircraft as is the
case with the F-104, the F-16, and other aerospace products.
Third, in view of growing nationalism, especially in Europe, there
is an emerging tendency for governments of nations with major air- 84
frame manufacturing capability to demand that preference be given to
native equipment by national airlines. Any U.S. policy which results
in the maintenance or increasing of the predominant market share of
U.S. commercial aircraft manufacturers might well cause explicit
and strong (and probably economically irrational) retaliation from
the offended countries. To bar U.S. participation in multi-national
airframe consortia could well be viewed in this light, probably to
20the detriment of all concerned.
Given a policy decision to permit U.S. participation in multi-
national consortia, it may be feasible for the public sector to apply
partial controls over the flows of technology between partners. In
Chapter 4, factors influencing the transfer of technology were listed.
It is possible for government to regulate some of the characteristics
of a consortium in an attempt to discourage flows of technology. For
example, the government may be able to exert limited controls over such
attributes of consortium as its duration, ownership structure, and the
21division of responsibilities within the enterprise. At the same time,
government probably cannot effectively bound or dictate the internal
management organization; nor can it practically constrain the internal
mechanics of such arrangements and functions, transfer pricing agreements
example of what can happen in such circumstances is provided
by the French Government's reversing a decision by Air France to acquire
Boeing. 737 aircraft to replace the Caravelle. The Concorde situation was
assumed to be the reason at the time.
21 Different kinds of responsibilities exist: managerial, financial,
and tasks. It is feasible for an outside entity to monitor and influence
the delegation of tasks assigned to and carried out by each consortium
member.
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(see Appendix) joint development teams, and the planning of the
assembly process. At best, then, government can have only limited
influence over the transfer of technology in multi-national con-
sortia. Moreover, a government's influence in this regard is greatest
r
prior to the actual formation of a consortium, declining rapidly as
the consortium begins to function.
In the event government seeks to regulate or control technology
transfer in a consortium setting, additional public policy issues will
arise: What agency of government is in the best position to regulate
technology transfer? Should the same agency that seeks to influence
(or regulate) industry structure also be responsible for controlling
technology transfer? By what means, if any, can the transfer of soft
technology (e.g., management technique) be regulated? Should military
considerations be incorporated into regulatory policy? How are
production processes to be protected if machine tools must be trans-
ferred in order to make possible the manufacture or assembly of airframes
and components? How is a variable price to be determined for technology
transferred in a multi-national consortium environment?
Employment
Employment in the U.S. aircraft industry (including airframe,
engines and engine parts, and other components and equipment) has
shown a fairly steady decline since the peak year of 1968. In 1976,
86
22however, 435,000 persons still worked in these areas. Although
the figures do not separate commercial from military equipment, they
give a reliable picture of the magnitude of employment in the fields
likely to be directly affected by the financial condition and prospects
of the airframe industry.
The formation of an airframe consortium involving only domestic
participants as a means of rationalizing, and thereby strengthening
the airframe industry, would appear to lead to a lower level of employ-
ment than would be possible if there were several competing, independent
firms. However, if rationalization is required to preserve the economic
viability of the industry, then absent such rationalization (through
consortia, mergers, etc.) there would be even fewer opportunities for
employment in the long run. Similar reasoning can be applied to the
case of U.S. participation in multi-national consortia. Although it
might be argued that some employment would be lost to foreign
countries, if such participation serves to strengthen and expand the
domestic industry, the net future employment picture might well be
improved. Such would be the probable result of the case where a U.S.
airframe manufacturer saw the market as requiring two different!'able
aircraft types, was unwilling to tackle more than one on its own, but
was prepared to join other firms in. a consortium to manufacture the second.
22Aerospace Industries Association of America, Economic Data Center,
Aerospace Facts and Figures 1977/78 (New York: Aviation Week & Space
Technology, McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 122.
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In any arrangement where U.S. participation leads to a strength-
ening of foreign commercial airframe capabilities, the cost might
include some foregone long-run domestic employment. Ultimately, how-
ever, the amount and composition of domestic employment in the aircraft
manufacturing field will depend on the character and extent of the
activities performed in the U.S., whether under consortium agreements
or not. Consortia do not automatically imply a reduction or an in-
crease in domestic aerospace employment opportunities, either short-
er long-run. Each case must be examined in detail and with the
requisite analytical skills to reach a conclusion in this regard.
One especially sensitive employment problem that arises in con-
nection with the formation of consortia (and the use of other means of
rationalization) concerns the timing of the demand for specific skills
in the cycle of design, development, and production. Exhibit 5-2
illustrates the time pattern of labor demand for the engineering, tooling,
and production phases of an aircraft program. It also implies that dif-
ferent skills are required in'different stages of the activity. In the
past in the U.S., the presence in the market of several manufacturers,
their typically being at different points in the cycle at the same time,
and the high mobility of the workforce have combined to keep the overall
industry's peaks and valleys of demand for special skills at far more
tolerable levels than would otherwise have been the case. The establish-
ment of consortia cannot but exacerbate the cyclical demand for skills
of various sorts if their formation reduces the number of transport
aircraft projects as seems certain. This final result may well be un-
avoidable anyway in an industry undergoing economic rationalization.
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Balance of Payments
Aerospace products make up a significant proportion of United
States exports. In 1975, the last year in which the United States
had a favorable balance of payments, the positive balance in aero-
space products was equivalent to 73.2 percent of the total U.S.
23
surplus. In the narrower context of civilian transport aircraft,
24
exports in 1976 had a value of approximately $2.5 billion. This
figure can be compared to a value of approximately $115 million for
25
all aircraft, new and used, which were imported during the same year.
Should major changes in the levels of U.S. exports and imports follow
formation of multi-national airframe consortia it would clearly have
a significant impact on the U.S. balance of payments. Once more, to
determine the precise effects requires detailed analysis of a specific
scenario leading to creation of multi-national consortia and the
conduct of the commercial aircraft industry thereafter.
In order to appreciate the effect of participation in a multi-
national consortia on the U.S. balance of payments, the accounting
procedure that would be,applied to these cooperative ventures must be
understood. The fundamental principle is to assign a dollar value to
any good or service that crosses an international boundary, at the time
of the crossing. Thus, in a consortium- agreement, components manu-
factured in the U.S. would be assigned a dollar value as an export as they
crossed into another country. Technological know-how that was supplied
from one country to another would also be ascribed a dollar value.
23
 Ibid., p. 107.
24
 Ibid., p. 111.
25
 Ibid, p. 109. 90
If an aircraft assembled in another country were purchased by a
U.S. firm, it would be considered an import by the U.S., while'if it were
purchased by a firm of a nation other than the U.S., its final sale
would not be included in domestic balance of payments accounting at
all, except through the net income that a U.S. firm, as a member of
a consortium, might realize from its sale.
The above accounting practice is designed to arrive at the net
value of U.S. exports and imports that result from participation in a
consortium. In practice, then, an aircraft manufactured in France
using certain U.S. components and know-how which is sold to a U.S. air
carrier would involve a net import for the United States, but the value
of the U.S. components that were first exported would be subtracted
from the price of the total aircraft that was imported.
Two other types of consortia should be considered. First, the
multi-national consortium without U.S. participation may or may not
influence the balance-of-trade through sales it realizes in the U.S.
But if it is at all active, it can be expected to reduce the sales
enjoyed by U.S. aircraft firms and hurt the U.S. payments position.
Airbus Industrie is a case in point, of course, even though its pro-
duct, the A-300, incorporates U.S.-supplied General Electric engines
and other components.
N
The all-U.S. consortium probably would have positive benefits for
the U.S. trade position, both in the short- and long-terms. This is
especially true if it were a response to consortia established outside
the U.S. with modes.t or no U.S. participation.- Were the all-U.S. joint
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enterprise viewed as a predatory act by foreign buyers, some re-
taliation might be forthcoming but the net effect would likely remain
positive.
Direct Government Intervention
Some form of direct government intervention would be indicated
to rationalize the airframe industry if consortia were not given
government sanction. Current government involvement in the industry is
clearly insufficient to effect rationalization; consequently, the pos-
sible forms of direct government intervention discussed in this chapter
should be compared to the alternative of consortia rather than to cur-
rent government policy.
Direct government intervention could manifest itself in various
ways, including programs to transfer risk from the private to the public
sector, direct sponsorship of aircraft development projects, subsidiza-
tion or restructuring of ailing firms, or nationalization of all parts
of the airframe industry.
Risk transfer or risk sharing could be assumed by the government
through:
0
 Outright grants,
0
 R&D contracts or loans, -.-.
° Support for specific tasks in the process of innovation
(e.g., prototyping, product testing, and international
marketing),
0
 Indemnification for losses experienced as a result of
lower-than expected sales,
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° Government ownership and bailment of assets (e.g.,
production buildings, tooling, and prototypes),
0
 Quasi-public banks to provide low-interest financing
for aircraft development,
0
 Subsidies to cover interest expenses,
0
 Guarantee of debt,
0
 Purchase of special issues of equities,
0
 Tax credits.
Another possible means of direct intervention-would be government
sponsorship of specific projects—a policy common in Europe. Govern-
ments have increasingly taken the position that, with respect to the
transport field, certain new vehicles are so important to the public in-
terest that it is worthwhile to underwrite projects to "see" such
pc
innovations, at least through the construction of a prototype, or even
further.
Of course, the most radica.l means of government intervention is
nationalization. All or part of the airframe industry might be affected
in what some might see as the ultimate rationalization. After all, this
has happened in such nations as France, Britain, and Canada. Such an
alternative might be seen as necessary to ensure continued viability in
the U.S. commercial airframe industry, especially if one or another or
the more promising alternatives (such as consortia) are treated as out-of-bounds.
26
 It is interesting to note that programs to develop taxicab, railroad,
and electricity-generating equipment prototypes are currently being
sponsored by the U.S. Government.
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-.. Direct intervention raises a number of thorny problems which
would have to be addressed. For instance, the security of government
investments made pursuant to such intervention presents a complex
policy issue. The government would have to determine its recourse in
the event of failure on the part of a debtor to which it had provided
funding. If the government were to demand senior liens--as it did in
27the case of Lockheed --it would likely neither bear any serious fin-
ancial risks in the long run, nor would it encourage management to
assume major risks for fear of the heavy penalties attendant upon
failure. In such cases, however, the government could encourage firms
to take relatively high risks through its willingness to take a lower-
priority claimant status.
For a government-financed or backed assistance program to be
functional, certain restrictions--e.g., liens, tests of financial
viability, criteria limiting uses of funds—will obviously have to be
incorporated into the program. Restrictions are intended to regulate the
decisions of management, but it is apparent that in doing so, they would
.also inhibit.management's freedom of action in a technological environ-
ment and a marketplace where financial success often requires timely, bold,
risk-laden decisions. If the government planned to be selective in choos-
ing projects for assistance programs",-criteria would have to be established
t.
to determine the relative worth and priority of various projects. However,
27
 Comptroller General of the United States, Reports to the Congress
by the Comptroller of the United States, Implementation of Emergency Loan
Guarantee Act (Washington, D.C.:General Accounting Office, April 25, 1977),
PP. 1, 3.
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any government selectivity whatsoever could well lead to changes in
intra-industry competition favoring particular firms over others.
Certainly, then, direct government intervention does not appear
to be as efficient a means of rationalizing the airframe industry as
the formation of consortia would be if the industry requires consoli-
dation to ensure long-term economic and market viability.
Summary
The principal elements of the discussion of this chapter are
summarized in Exhibit 5-3. This matrix relates several prominent means
of achieving commercial airframe industry rationalization with major
public policy issues. The matrix considers the intrarelationships
between sixteen public policy issues and six different types of coop-
erative arrangements. The latter are:
0
 Multi-national consortia with significant U.S. participation;
0
 Multi-national prime-subcontractor relationships with
significant U.S. participation;
° - Multi-national consortia without U.S. participation;
0
 Multi-national prime-subcontractor relationships without
U.S. participation;
0
 All-United States consortia;
\t.0
 All-United States prime-subcontractor relationships.
The matrix is coded so as to reflect positive and negative intrarela-
tionships (of varying "strengths") as well as indeterminacies, and
those cases where there appear to be no interrelationships between
the issue and the sort of cooperative arrangement hypothesized. In
95
all cases, the implications are reckoned in terms of the U.S. public
interest which, among other things, is taken to favor both continued
U.S. "predominance" and "preeminence" in commercial transport aircraft.
It is instructive to scan each row and column of Exhibit 5-3.
The frequency of "I's" (indeterminate relationships) is striking. In
many instances these indeterminacies can be converted into a more
precise estimate of the interrelationship if substantial analysis is
undertaken. The point to make at present, however, is that the inter-
actions need to be understood far better before public policy positions
are established with respect to cooperative arrangements for the pro-
duction of transport aircraft. This applies especially to the consortia
which are far more formal and highly structured than the typical
prime-subcontractor relationships with which they are contrasted in
Exhibit 5-3.
It is also important to note that Exhibit 5-3 buttresses the argu-
ment advanced through Exhibit 5-1 which traces the implications of
cooperative arrangements in a different way. Taken together, these ex-
hibits lead to several inescapable conclusions: First, the formation of
consortia for the production and sale of transport aircraft, regardless
of their location and whether or not U.S. firms participate, is a matter
of considerable concern to the United States. Whcra a proposed arrangement
is multi-national, the ability of the United States airframe industry to
maintain market predominance at a very high level is jeopardized along
with its ability to sustain high employment and to contribute to a
favorable U.S. trade. On the other hand, if consortia or other mechanisms
of rationalization are undertaken involving only U.S. firms, the negative
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impaets would seem to be small and may even be substantially positive
on balance if both the conditions of supply in the airframe industry
and the character of demand continue to change in the directions
already manifest, as discussed above.
It is abundantly clear that governmental attitudes toward con-
sortia, multi-national and otherwise, have substantial actual or potential
impacts on a variety of public policy issues. The precise implications
in any proposed or actual consortium arrangement for each of the public
policy issues can only be determined once the specifics of the con-
sortium are known as well as the details of the competitive and tech-
nological environments in which the consortia are projected to operate.
Since there are many conditions under which the formation of consortia
involving U.S. airframe producers generates net public benefits to the
United States, it is critical not to rule out consortia as an alternative
for rationalization in any general way; it also seems prudent to pro-
vide guidance to airframe manufacturers as to what the limits of permis-
sability are in the formation and operation of consortia, multi-national
or all-U.S.
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• - .. Chapter 6
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this work program, manifest in Chapters 2 through
5, lead to a number of findings and recommendations.
Findings
International arrangements for the cooperative development
and production of commercial transport aircraft represent potential
mechanisms for the transfer of technology. The technology susceptible
to transfer falls into three general categories:
0
 Product-embodied technology,
0
 Process technology,
0
 Management technology or technique.
The degree to which technology is likely to be transferred through
such arrangements as multi-national consortia depends upon several
factors including—
0
 The proprietary or investment interest of the
transferor in the transferee;
0
 The specific divisions of responsibilities
between parties to the" arrangements;
0
 The scope and duration of the venture;
0
 The organizational structure of the joint
enterprise;
0
 The nature and extent of inter-personal professional
relationships between individuals from the various
partners assigned to the international effort. 99
In order to grasp the full range of implications flowing
from the international transfer of technology through multi-
national cooperative arrangements, it is necessary to cast the
analytical net broadly to include consideration of the economic
character and trends in the airframe industry which require
industry rationalization, the motives for manufacturers to partici-
pate in consortia, and a set of related public policy issues including:
0
 Technology transfer mechanisms and motives,
0
 Antitrust,
0
 Employment,
0
 Market access for U.S. firms,
0
 Access to U.S. Markets by non-U.S. firms,
0
 Balance of payments,
0
 Competition in transport aircraft markets,
0
 Foreign relations,
— __° _. -Military capabilities.
Economic Character and Trends in the Airframe Industry
0
 There has been a precipitous climb in the development
and threshold costs required to support commercial
aircraft innovation from the mid-193(/s to the present;
these project "launching" costs continue to rise, often
exceeding the net worth of the aircraft producers.
100.
The number of commercial transport airframe manufacturers
has decreased in the past four decades, in part because of
the sharp increase in the threshold investment associated
with producing modern aircraft, and in part because of the
increase in lift capacity represented by each aircraft.
With such changes in the relevant production functions the
market for aircraft has not been large enough to support
the number of aircraft suppliers of earlier years.
To maintain an efficient range of production (in terms of
levels of output), an airframe manufacturer must capture a
larger share of the free world market for transport air-
craft in the 1970's than would have been the case in the
1950's or earlier.
The changing cost structure of aircraft production, the
express intentions of other nations to expand their share
of the free world market, and changes in the regulatory
environment necessitate the rationalization of the commer-
cial airframe industry. Such rationalization would enable
the commercial aircraft industry to accommodate changing
conditions on both the supply and demand sides while re-
maining effectively competitive and economically viable in
the long run. ' "
The means of rationalization employed in the airframe in-
dustry should promote an industry structure in which—
1) each product has unique payload/range and operating
cost characteristics, so as to have defined a place
101
in the spectrum of transport aircraft offered; and
2) at the margins, each product competes with other air-
craft having somewhat different payload/range charac-
teristics, so as to avoid any significant measure of
monopoly. In this way, although producers are not
guaranteed profit, they will be spared some of the
consequences of destructive competition, while the
maintenance of effective competition serves the ends
of air carriers and of the public alike.
0
 The consortium represents one especially attractive method
of rationalizing the structure of the airframe industry,
both nationally and internationally, in order to spread
costs and risks while minimizing the losses experienced by
any one producer.
Motives for Participating in Consortia
0
 A principal motive for commercial airframe manufacturers
- t'
to participate in consortia is to reduce the magnitude of
financing required to launch a new airframe project by
sharing risks, costs, and responsibilities with other firms.
0
 The mechanism of a consortium can be expected to reduce
the resources required for the development, production and
marketing of a transport aircraft below what would obtain
if any individual participant were to undertake the project
alone. However, the consortium device will probably in-
crease markedly the total resources required for its project.
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0
 From the European standpoint, consortia permit European
nations as a whole to maintain a full spectrum of capa-
bilities in the commercial airframe field. This view of
consortia is, to a certain extent, a function of national
and regional pride.
0
 The primary motive of U.S. firms for considering partici-
pation in multi-national consortia is the enhancement of
their individual financial resources. The consortium
mechanism might also provide a means for a U.S. firm to
pursue contemporaneously more than one transport aircraft
development project.
0
 Preservation of market access is a secondary, but perhaps
at times important, motive for commercial airframe manufacturers
to join multi-national consortia.
0
 In contrast, European firms do not rank the motive of en-
hancement of financial resources very high. The primary
motive of European-firms for seeking U.S. participation in
consortia is more effective penetration of U.S. markets.
This is true whether the European firm is nationalized,
private, or of mixed ownership.
0
 For the most part, non-11.S. firms deny or treat as. dis-
tinctly subsidiary any possible motivation of technology
transfer in their desire for U.S. representation in a
multi-national consortium. They do expect, however, that
through .a consortium with U.S. participation they might
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acquire insight into the increased efficiency with
which U.S. aircraft are produced when production, runs
are large.
Technology Transfer
0
 Three types of technology are central to airframe pro-
duction and marketing:
I)- product-embodied technology,
2) manufacture process technology,
3) management technology or technique.
Operation of a consortium might lead to the transfer
of one or more of these types of technology.
0
 Product-embodied technology advances and becomes obsolete
relatively quickly. Although continuing advancement
through research is vital to national preeminence, it is
generally agreed that commercial airframe technology is
presently at an essentially equivalent level of sophis-
tication, at least among major manufacturers in the non-
communist world. Consequently, there appears to be
little chance of injury to the U.S. competitive position
in the commercial airframe field if product-embodied tech-
nology were shared through a multi-national consortium,
!_
with or without U.S. participation.
0
 The superior process technology of the U.S. airframe pro-
ducers is acknowledged by competitors in other parts of
the world. Most often this advantage is attributed to the
large scale of U.S. aircraft manufacturing programs.
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The Concorde and the Lockheed F-104 programs, among others,
demonstrate that process technology is transferable.
Moreover, such technology can, in the long run, be more
valuable to the transferee than product-embodied technology.
Management technique has rarely, if ever, been transferred
effectively through international cooperative arrange-
ments in the aviation field. Nonetheless, management
technology appears to be a primary reason for the con-
sistent predominance by U.S. firms of the free-world com-
mercial aircraft market.
To the present, other nations do not generally recognize
the importance of process technology and management
technique to the maintenance of the U.S. predominant
position in the airframe industry. There is no reason,
however, to expect that their importance will continue to
be overlooked in the future.
It is probable that U.S. process and management technology,
with regard to transport aircraft, would be transferred
overseas only through U.S. participation in a multi-national
consortia.
Three conditions must .be met for the transfer of U.S.
technology to be inimical to U.S. national interests:
1) foreign assimilation of U.S. production processes
and management techniques; :
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2) translation of transferred technology into an
improved competitive position for non-U.S. firms;
3) determination that the net effect of such increased
foreign competition will be detrimental to U.S. in-
terests.
The transfer of product-embodied technology through co-
operative production arrangements is not a significant
public policy issue. At present, such technology is con-
sidered approximately equivalent among the major transport
airframe competitors; U.S. firms participating in multi-
national consortia would be as likely to acquire as to pro-
vide such technology. In any case, the advantage which a
foreign firm might gain from such a transfer would probably
be short-lived.
It is in the mutual interest of the U.S. Government and
the U.S. aerospace industry that unique commercial airframe
process technology and management technique not be trans-
ferred through multi-national cooperative arrangements,
including consortia.
Consortia can be established and operated in such a way as to
either promote or thwart the transfer of technology.
At best, the Government can have only limited control over
the transfer of technology in a multi-national consortia
once the enterprise is established.
Technology transfer in a consortium is most affected by the
division of responsibilities among consortium participants.
There is a direct relationship between the breadth and overlap
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of responsibilities and parity among consortium members
and the extent of technology transfer between them.
Technology transfer is affected to a lesser extent by the
anticipated and actual duration of the consortium. Technology
transfer and diffusion are probably maximized in consortia
where a well-defined, long-term project is undertaken.
The organizational structure of a consortium will also
affect the extent and pace of technology transfer. As the
size and complexity of a consortium's management increases,
so does the amount of personal interaction. The likelihood
of technology transfer is heightened where executives for
the consortium project are drawn from consortium partners
and where there is a programmed rotation of such personnel
between the consortium enterprise and their own "parent" firm
at relatively frequent intervals.
The transfer of technology and technique enabling overseas
firms to increase their world commercial airframe market
share could serve U.S. interests by:
1) promoting the domestic political stability of
U.S. allies by strengthening national and regional
economics;
2) helping to enhance or maintain U.S. allies' capabili-
ties to produce sophisticated military equipment; and
3) minimizing retaliation from foreign countries which
resent the overwhelming U.S. predominance of the free-
world market for commercial transport aircraft.
However, these "benefits" must in each case be weighed
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against the "costs" incurred by the U.S. in terms of
the balance-of-payments, employment levels, etc.
Antitrust Policy
0
 Among the most significant barriers to the formation of
both domestic and multi-national consortia is antitrust
policy. The United States Department of Justice is not
presently receptive to the suggestion that there may be a
need for rationalization of the commercial airframe in-
dustry without which effective market competition may
be reduced in the long run and U.S. interests may suffer
materially in several ways.
0
 • The only means currently available to a firm contemplating
participation in any consortium to ascertain formally the
acceptability of that consortium to the antitrust
authorities is the-Business Review Procedure of the
Department of Justice. However, even a positive opinion
by. the Justice Department does not grant a permanent ex-
emption from prosecution.
0
 The competitive impact of any proposed cooperative arrange-
ment will be gauged by the Department of.Justice primarily by:
4.
1) the extent to which market competition in the U.S.
between commercial airframe producers would be fore-
closed in both the short term and the long term, and
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2) the way in which the arrangement proposes to treat the
issue of technology transfer.
0
 The competitive effects of proposed airframe consortia are
largely indeterminate ex ante, particularly in the long
run. However, given the present and prospective nature of
the commercial airframe production process, both multi-
national and all-U.S. consortia have at least as great a
likelihood of enhancing competition as of thwarting it.
Other Public Policy Issues
0
 Although technological preeminence supports market pre-
dominance, it is not necessarily a guarantee to market
predominance, especially in the short run.
0
 Neither multi-national consortia with U.S. participation
nor all-U.S. consortia automatically imply either a reduc-
tion or an increase in domestic aerospace employment oppor-
tunities, in either the short run or long run. Each case
must be analyzed on its own merits.
0
 Competitive multi-national consortia can be expected to
reduce direct sales by U.S. aircraft firms and to jeopar-
dize the ability of the U.S. to maintain market predominance
at a very high level. Especially where such a consortium
operates without U.S. participation, U.S. employment levels,
trade position, etc. will suffer.
0
 Under certain conditions, the formation of an all-U.S. consortium
as a means of achieving necessary rationalization would have
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positive effects on the U.S. trade position and on other
U.S. interests, both in the short run and long run.
As long as a U.S. participant in a multi-national con-
sortium does not propose to use or contribute military-
oriented technology, a consortium project should have
little difficulty receiving approval from the Office of
Export Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Direct U.S. government intervention in the commercial
transport airframe industry is likely to be required to
effect rationalization if "strong" and timely cooperative
or joint arrangements (e.g., mergers or consortia) are not
implemented by the industry itself.
Consortia appear to be a more desirable and efficient
means of rationalization than direct government involvement.
Where consortia or other mechanisms of rationalization are
undertaken involving only U.S. firms, the effects in terms of
overall U.S. interests are expected to be substantially positive
if both the conditions of supply in the airframe industry and
the level and character of demand for transport aircraft
continue to change in the directions manifest in the past.
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Recommendations
United States Pre
Transport Aircraft Market
0
 U.S. public policy must promote and facilitate continued
U.S. technological preeminence and predominance
in the transport aircraft field in particular.
0
 The U.S. should establish a clear goal reflecting at least
the minimum level of U.S. commercial airframe market
participation to permit achievement of public policy ob-
jectives in employment and balance of payments.
0
 The broad spectrum of international interests of the U.S.
must be taken into account in determining the level of
commercial airframe market predominance by U.S. firms.
0
 In the event that multi-national cooperative ventures are
formed with U.S. participation, a federal agency should
be designated to monitor the potential for the transfer of
valuable technological information, data, or materials.
Active regulation would become necessary only when the U.S.
member(s) does not appear adequately motivated to protect
these assets.
Antitrust Policy and Procedure. >
0
 Antitrust policies must be reviewed frequently to assure that
they do not impede the development of an efficient,
competitive U.S. commercial airframe industry. In this con-
nection, it is recommended that the Business Review Procedure
(BRP) of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department
See page 67 for definitions and discussion^ o.f^ pj^ ejTiinence1' and •
'predominance." ; .. _ . _7TI ~
of Justice be reviewed for possible modification or
replacement to provide this industry with reliable,
timely guidance along lines parallel to the "no-action
letter" employed by the Internal Revenue Service.
0
 High priority must be attached to the Justice Department's
finding means to make clear at all times its position
with regard to the formation and operation of consortia
and alternative cooperative arrangements in the airframe
manufacturing industry.
0
 A study should be undertaken to determine whether the
airframe industry (or any other industry displaying
similarly changing cost characteristics) should be granted
a degree of immunity from antitrust prosecution approxim-
ating that granted labor, public utilities, and agricultural
cooperatives, among others.
0
 It is strongly recommended that consortia not be ruled out
in any general way as an alternative means for achieving
- rationalization in the commercial airframe industry.
Alternatives to Consortia
0
 If consortia or other rationalization mechanisms are not
permitted to operate, the goverment .must be prepared to
develop risk-mitigating devices and/or to provide direct
resource support that will enable airframe manufacturers
to launch new, competitive, commercial airframe programs.
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The U.S. should monitor on a continuing basis the
economic and competitive state of the U.S. and world
commercial airframe industry. This is necessary to
ascertain:
1) U.S. performance in terms of market participation;
2) Sources and character of present and anticipated
competition;
3) The need for industry rationalization and the
steps being taken abroad to meet such needs;
4) Character of rationalization mechanisms to be
applied in the U.S. and the timing of their
application.
Role of NASA
Because a reliable flow of new airframe technology is
necessary to longrterm U.S. competitiveness, and because
the U.S. commercial airframe industry does not presently
hold a clear competitive edge in product-embodied technology,
and because the research necessary to develop and test such
airframe-embodied innovations represents investments that
the private sector generally cannot readily undertake,
NASA research efforts supporting continued U.S. technological
advancement should be expanded.
NASA's programs in R&T should be geared to the retention of
U.S. technological preeminence in the commercial airframe
field.
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NASA's research and technology support for the U.S.-
commercial airframe industry should be re-examined to
determine whether significant research efforts should
be directed to manufacturing process technology and
management technique because of the importance of these
factors in the maintenance of the U.S. airframe in-
dustry's comparative advantage.
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Appendix
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF COOPERATIVE VENTURES
Terms such as "consortium" or "joint venture" have long been
used to describe a wide variety of cooperative business ventures.
However, not all of these types of ventures are likely to exist in
the airframe industry. This appendix describes those types of
ventures, primarily consortia, which are relevant to this study.
The descriptions will be considered applicable to both domestic
ventures and to those which combine U.S. firms with enterprises
of other nations.
s
Traditionally, firms have formed cooperative relationships for
a variety of reasons, primarily the desire to gain entrance to a new
market or to spread the risks of an uncertain venture. In addition,
economies of scale derived from combining capital and/or technological
resources may make development of a new product feasible for a firm which
does not possess, by itself, sufficient resources. Finally, market
forces may exist which make it impossible for more than one supplier
to survive in a given market.
Consorti a—Major Joint Development'Projects
!.
Definition
The concept of a consortium is difficult to define precisely be-
cause the term is used to refer to cooperative ventures which have as
A-l
their primary characteristics two different qualities. The definition
in "this appendix treats these two qualities as two conditions, either
of which is sufficient to denote a consortium. Although the dictionary
definition of a consortium requires that it be international, the
two conditions given below can be applied just as well to exclusively
domestic ventures.
Balance of Authority—No single firm can be in the position to
dictate all decisions. Thus, if there are only two firms, each must
have roughly 50 percent of decisionmaking power, implying that both firms
must agree to any decision. The Concorde project, governed by a
treaty between the French and British governments, operates on this
2
principle. If there are more than two firms, no single member can
unilaterally implement a decision binding the whole consortium,
although an alliance between a firm with a large share and one with a
smaller share could have control. An example of this type of arrange-
ment is the European Airbus project in which the Germans, represented by
Deutsche Airbus (itself a consortium), and the French, represented by
Aerospatiale, each have only 47.9 percent of the decisionmaking authority.
3
The balance is held by CASA, a Spanish Company.
1 - -•'-
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Collegiate Series 8 ed.
(1975), s.v. "consortium."
p
John Davis,.The Concorde Affair; From Drawing Board to Actuality
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1969), pp. 78-80.
Basic Organisation Airbus Project, fact sheet prepared by Fokker-
VFW International b.v. Amsterdam U977J.
A-2
Risk Sharing—The other sufficient condition for the existence
of a consortium is a sharing of risk, as opposed to a strictly buy-sell
(prime-subcontractor) relationship, between the parties to the effort.
A participant in a consortium must actually risk capital, thereby
having an interest in the success of the venture beyond that of a
supplier of components at a fixed price.
Therefore, in order to qualify as a consortium, a joint venture may
exhibit only a balance of authority (with no risk sharing), only risk
sharing (with no balance of authority), or both qualities concurrently.
The basic principle is that a consortium's members work together towards
a common goal, although shares and decisionmaking power may differ.
Other arrangements in which one firm is clearly subordinate (for
example, subcontracting, partially or wholly owned foreign sub-
sidiaries with the primary role of marketing agents, or licensing agree-
ments) are also observed in the airframe industry. They will be touched
upon later in this appendix, but they are beyond this strict definition
of a consortium.
Issues to be Resolved
Consortia must resolve certain key issues (listed in Exhibit A-l)
in order to function. Such ventures can be differentiated according to
the decisions which they make and the institutional arrangements which
they employ in settling these issues. The following are descriptions of
the issues and some of the options available to potential consortium
participants.
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Exhibit A-1
ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED BY A CONSORTIUM
Goal (Nature of the Product)
Control
Duration
Legal Entity
Management Structure
Technology-Sharing Arrangements
Financial Arrangements
Transfer Prices
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' - Goal--Every consortium in the business sector is formed with
the goal of producing a certain product, the nature of which is the
first issue which must be resolved. In the airframe industry, the
product might be limited to only one phase of the business such as
sales, development, basic research, or production. Most commonly, it
is a complete aircraft which is the product of all of the above steps.
Control--A second issue is the degree of control which can be
exercised by any one firm. As the definition indicates, in some consortia
no single firm has a controlling share of authority. But consortia in
which risk is shared, with one firm having control, are also possible.
The issue of control is especially important in consortia which
include both privately and publicly owned firms. Public enterprises are
generally more concerned with maximizing employment than with maintain-
ing long-run profitability. In addition, because they are more concerned
with stability, nationalized companies are less likely than private firms
to vary their output in response to changes in market demand. There is also
the possibility that decisions of a publicly owned firm will lack con-
sistency over a period of time due to changes in the political regime.
Duration—The participants in a consortium must decide on the
expected duration of the enterprise. If the purpose of the consortium is
to develop and produce a specific airplane, it is possible that the
enterprise's life could be limited to the length of time during which
the production line is operating, or during which the aircraft would be
in service. However, the length of time required to provide services
A-5
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until the last of a model (or variation) has been retired might prove
to be quite long. In addition, the benefits derived from cooperating
on one aircraft might be maintained through continued cooperation on
subsequent aircraft. Thus, although the originally anticipated duration
of a consortium may be limited, the possibilities for indefinite co-
4
operation seem significant.
Legal Entity—A fourth issue which must be resolved is the exact
nature of the legal entity to be formed. There are two common types,
with infinite variations.
The first is a jointly owned subsidiary, separate from but controlled
by the parent firms, with the amount of control over the subsidiary re-
flecting the degree of each parent firm's participation in the consortium."
Airbus Industrie (which produces the A-300) is an example of this kind of
arrangement, although complicated by the involvement of governments. The
Airbus project is based on a "Framework Agreement" between the governments
of France, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands. As such, it has an "Inter-
governmental Committee" which provides governmental input to management.
But the "main contractor for the whole program" is Airbus Industrie, a
separate company structured as a "Government d'Interet Economique (G.I.E.)
which is a particular company structure, unique to French law."
A consortium of indefinite duration, however, would still be distinct
from a merger as long as it did not involve the complete consolidation of
two firms. In the aerospace industry, a merger would mean joint effort
on many projects besides commercial transports. It would also require that
the two firms be indistinguishable financially.
5
Basic Organisation Airbus Project.
N.W. Boorer, Some Observations of European Collaborative Projects,
provided by the author, p. 4.
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As a separate company, Airbus Industrie "signs the contracts with its
suppliers...and...the sales agreements with the airlines." It is
important to note that such a jointly owned subsidiary, because it has
its own structure and authority, could very well develop a kind of in-
dependent momentum, making collaboration on subsequent projects through
the subsidiary a logical consequence.
A second type of legal entity involves a legally binding agreement
between the partners without the formation of a separate company. Such
a contract or treaty is usually sufficiently detailed to make clear the
division of effort among the partners. The Concorde project is based on
a set of such agreements, governed by a treaty between the British and
French governments. The treaty makes reference to other agreements be-
tween the British and French companies which actually perform work on the
o
aircraft. However, there is no separate corporate entity comparable to
Airbus Industrie.
Management Structure—The resolution of the issue of how a con-
sortium will be managed necessarily depends upon which legal form the
consortium takes. A jointly owned subsidiary has its own set of man-
agers, borrowed from the parent companies and/or hired from outside.
Although the final hiring and policy authority should rest with the
parents (in the agreed-upon proportions), such an organization could
develop a certain level of autonomy (depending on the proportion of
managers hired from outside the parent firms).
7Ibid., p. 4.
Q
John Costello and Terry Hughes, The Concorde Conspiracy; The
International Race for the SST (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976),
pp 51, 286-87.
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• -A consortium based entirely on a contractual agreement requires a
joint managing committee to oversee the application of the agreement in
day-to-day operations. The members of this joint committee might be
chosen from the participants in the consortium in proportion to the
relative contribution of each partner. In cases in which the consortium
rests upon an agreement between governments, there are likely to be at
least two levels of committees, the top level being made up of govern-
ment officials and considering broad policy questions, with a second-
level committee for day-to-day operations as described above. The
g
Concorde project is run by a series of such committees. Even projects
which lead to the formation of a subsidiary, if they are based on inter-
government agreements (especially if they include nationalized firms)
can have a government-level committee with broad policy oversight
authority. The "Inter-governmental Committee," overseeing Airbus Industrie,
is an example. - -
q
Boorer, Some Observations of European Collaborative Projects, p. 3.
No matter which management structure is implemented, participants
in a consortium face a certain level of costs associated with coordination
and consultation between them. These "transactions costs" are not likely to
appear directly on the books of either partner. Nevertheless, time and
effort are expended to maintain coordination between participants that would
not have to be spent in a single-firm; venture.
The level of transactions costs in a consortium is likely to be related
to two factors. The first is the autonomy of the legal entity's management
structure.. On an a priori basis, one would expect these costs to be less
significant for subsidiaries than for managing committees because the degree
of direct input from the parent companies would be smaller. The second factor
is the degree to which profit maximization, rather than political objectives,
is important to management. The introduction of politics into a consortium
can lead to disagreement over points having more to do with public policy
or national pride than with profitability.
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Technology Sharing—Partners in a consortium for the development
of a technological product such as an airframe must decide how to
share the technological contributions of each. Specific arrangements
are necessary in order to regulate or to prevent the use of the
technological development of one company by its partners, turned competitors,
after the termination of the consortium, or on projects which are separate
from the consortium. Without such protection, the incentive to con-
tribute technology may be small.
For technology that has already been developed by one of the parti-
cipants, there are three options for disseminating it to the others:
0
 Patented technology can be licensed to other partners,
perhaps for a nominal royalty. Such a license might
specify that for the life of the patent, the licensee
use the technology in question only as part of the
jointly produced airframe. In cases of multi-national
consortia, such licenses should be made enforceable under
the laws of the licensee's country, and the countries
in which aircraft using the technology might be sold.
0
 Know-how which is not patented might be shared without
a formal licensing agreement, although the terms of its
transfer could be set down in the agreement governing
V
the consortium.
0
 A third possibility is the provision by one partner of certain
components, intact, keeping the technology to itself. Such
an arrangement can be a necessary condition for participation
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in an international consortium if the technology is
considered to have national security value by the
participant's government.
A consortium is also likely to generate new technology. The arrange-
ment for patenting it depends on the nature of the consortium. Consortia
that include no jointly owned company can specify development tasks in
the governing contract. This contract can also include a provision for
cross-licensing of new technology. Such a provision states that newly
patented developments of any partner are automatically to be licensed to
the others. It provides the same protection for post-consortium use of
the technology by the partner which developed it as licensing of present
technology.
If the consortium sets up a semi-autonomous operating unit,
technological developments made by it are difficult to attribute to any
particular partner. In such a case, a patent can be taken out in the
name of the unit. The technology is thereby protected for the duration
of the consortium (unless the consortium exceeds the patent's time limit).
If the partners want to use the technology in other areas, they can be
licensed by their subsidiary.
0
Financial Arrangements—The resolution of what financial arrange-
•x
«.
ments are to support the consortium depends heavily upon its exact
nature. Any agreement, however, should cover certain areas. For example,
capital is required for development and production. If the consortium
is of the jointly owned subsidiary type, each partner provides a portion
A-10
of its capitalization, although the subsidiary can also raise funds
through the sale of its own obligations. Mhere no such company exists,
each partner generally must provide the necessary capital to back its
own contribution to development or to production.
A governing agreement must also specify the division of liabilities
among the partners. Again, with a semi-autonomous operating unit, the
task is simpler, as the operating unit—a subsidiary itself—is liable;
and the partners may be affected only in their capacity as owners.
The profits earned by a consortium have to be distributed, as well
as the proceeds from liquidation once its task is completed. The most
obvious division is according to levels of capital contributions. How-
ever, transfer prices are, in essence, a device that allocates profit,
as well.
Projects which are conducted at the inter-government level (such as
Airbus and Concorde) actually resemble government programs more than
business ventures. As such, governments supply large amounts of funding
for the projects, which are constrained more by political than by
economic considerations.
Transfer Prices—A final issue for a consortium to resolve is the
arrangement(s) specifying the prices .at which goods and services are
».
transferred between members or between the consortium (as a.distinct entity)
and one of its members. Transfer prices can be (1) strictly on a cost-
reimbursement basis, (2) negotiated on the basis of marginal costs, or
(3) arbitrarily prespecified charges. The transfer-pricing mechanism and
A-ll
the basis upon which these prices are computed play an important
role in the attitude of each individual consortium member with respect
to its obligation to the overall enterprise. For example, if one of
the members experiences a substantial unforeseen cost in the process
of development of an airframe component, its ability to pass some
of these excesses through the consortium is largely a function of the
transfer-pricing arrangement. Thus, its response to unforeseen costs
(e.g., halt production) can be influenced by its ability to pass some
of these costs through to its partners.
Other Types of Cooperative Ventures
Joint ventures in which one firm dominates decisionmaking and in
which there is no sharing of risk are also possible for the airframe
industry. Examples of such arrangements are licensing, subcontracting,
and the acquisition of foreign marketing subsidiaries. Licensing or
subcontracting may be used in what is known as a production offset agree-
ment, in which a certain amount of production work is performed in the
country to which an aircraft is exported. These types of agreements
are most prevalent in the area of military aircraft (the F-16 sales to
Europe are an example). However, with the increasing specter of pro-
%
tectionism in the aviation, industry, production offsets are becoming
more important determinants in aircraft purchase decisions.
An interesting hybrid combination of several of the above categories
has been proposed recently by Boeing. The company wants British Aerospace
A-12
Corporation to "take over the design leadership and production of
a stretched version of its successful 737 civil airliner."
Boeing would act as a subcontractor by providing the cockpit and
fuselage, while the British would provide the wing and be in charge
12
of overall development and assembly. The plan, although containing
elements of a prime sub-relationship, appears to be essentially an
enhanced production offset agreement. "Boeing is seriously concerned
about the growing resentment in Europe over its dominance of the civil
jet market," and may, therefore, be offering the Europeans a chance
to develop a derivative aircraft as a means of counteracting such
resentment.
"Boeing Wants to Build 737's in Britain," The Economist (August 13-19,
1977), p. 73.
12Ibid., p. 73
13Ibid.,p. 74. .
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